Sincronía Verano 2003

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Japanese Political Culture Under the Realist PerspectiveWith References to The Nipo-Brazilian Relations

Juliano Siqueira

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Introduction: Comments on The Japan of The 1970’s

 

 

      On September 16, 1974, the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei landed foot in Brazil. In his meeting with the president Ernesto Geisel, he brought promises of Japanese aid in various areas: infrastructure, industry, agriculture and transfer of technology. Nevertheless, the Japanese government’s intention was far more complex than benevolence: at the same time Tanaka demonstrated interests in developing the Brazilian economy, there was also the subjective intent of Japan becoming the primary beneficiary in such endeavour.

Put in a larger picture, Tanaka’s visit to Brazil was part of a series of trips of Japanese envoys with proposals of development -- which included South East Asia, Oceania, Latin America, Middle East and Africa.[1] Among several topics discussed in these visits, Tanaka’s administration objective was to foster international ties outside the American influence, establishing further international trade, liberate Japan from its natural-resource constraints, and to relocate the over-rated pollution-generating plants to overseas lands (kigyo iju[2]).

In the 1970’s the Japanese industry was challenged by a couple of problems, which included shortage of labour and numerous types of pollution in urban centres. First of all, Kougai (environmental disruption) reached unbearable levels; ranging from photochemical smog, cadmium, oil to noise and an overall impoverishment of the quality of life in the Japanese urban centres.[3] Secondly, the fast development of Japanese industry in the 1960’s and high competitiveness with the neighbouring Asian countries, drove Japan in the need for a larger labour force.[4] As Tanaka assumed power, the Japanese government intentions to solve such problems were by: (1) using of the Corporation for the Relocation of Industry, headed by Kenichiro Hirata (2) to move as many industrial plants as possible to countries or places where environmental laws were basically inexistent at that time (3) move the industry to countries where labour force was abundant and cheap (4) move the industry to countries where the natural resources were readily available.[5]  

A second issue that troubled Japan was the oil crisis of 1973. In short terms, the crisis represented the OAPEC announcement that they would cut off oil to ‘unfriendly nations,’ which nonetheless included Japan due to its support of US pro-Israeli resolutions. At the time of the oil embargo Japan was the world biggest oil importer, with an estimate of 85% of its domestic consumption originated in the Middle East. Hence, the OAPEC announcement took Eij Yamagata (Head of Natural resources Agency) together with Kakuei and Nakasone (at that time Minister of International Trade and Industry) to believe that Japan would run into an economic collapse.[6]

With an estimate of four days until the Japanese oil reserve runs out, the Japanese government had to think about their alternatives its supply, and engage on building alliances to establish the continuation of oil accessibility. Hence, a key actor that was to influence the outcome of this Japanese impasse was the United States. The King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, among others, had warned the Japanese following the American lead in supporting pro-Israeli resolutions. This took Japanese leaders on serious debates revolving the US-Japan relationship; which was backed up by a general concern on how the US would react if Japan suddenly stepped way from its lead. Tanaka responded with much strength, issuing a communiqué urging Israel to withdraw from the territories it had occupied as result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and, stressing the right of the Palestine people to self determination. Moreover, partially due to the fear of Japanese companies losing their assets in the Middle East, the Japanese government started a development aid program geared towards Arab countries.[7]        

 At the same time that the oil embargo troubled the Japanese economy, the US had declared an embargo on soy exports in 1973. Once again, Japan depended overwhelmingly on the supply of the essential foodstuff, which mistakenly came strictly from one source. Japan depended and still does, heavily on the import of food materials, and with the soy embargo, it feared of a further world shortage of grain supply. Like the oil shock, the soy embargo lead Japan to move away from its compromises with the US and to look for alternate suppliers of soy. This case is particularly interesting for igniting a strong cooperation with the Brazilian government in the development of agroindustry, specifically the production of soy.[8]

 

Realism: A Perspective for The Japanese Political Culture

 

This essay will deal with the Japanese political culture, focused on its foreign relations during the 1970’s. Hence, it is not my intention to discuss a wide range of characteristics that may involve the formation Japanese political culture towards foreign countries. Instead, by looking at the slight shift away form a US-lead to a more independent and influential international position, I wish to highlight on this essay that the realist theoretical view hold some truth in defining the Japanese political culture at that time.

Hypothetically, in order to fully grasp the character of Japanese political culture towards international relations, one must first analyse a vast number of cases, giving them the appropriate weight of significance in the composition of the whole. As much as the study of international relations reveals multi-facet aspects of interactions in the global system, it is possible to reveal several different levels in which a subject interacts with another. In spite of that, none of the individual revelations that we may encounter can solely characterize the essence of the subject in study.  

Henceforth, knowing such limitations of the work, I chose to highlight the realist aspect of the Japanese political culture towards foreign relations for the following reasons: (1) self-interest of a state is a key factor that aids on perpetuating its sovereignty: when Kissinger asked Tanaka to hold on to the US lead after the oil shock, the Japanese self interests prevailed and a shift away from the US occurred;[9] (2) In the 1970’s Japan reached a first-world-country status, and with that, questions such as its relationship with the US as an equal partner were raised: within the realist framework Japan engaged in balance of power with eth US by extending an independent influence throughout the world;[10] (3) The case of Japanese aid to third world countries can be illustrated under the aspect of self-interested: Japanese aid is argued to be a form of extending economic control, and a substitute or supplement to military security efforts.[11]    

Theoretically speaking, realists argue that dependence of a state onto another is a form of being controlled and having its sovereignty vulnerable.[12] For instance, in the oil shock of 1973, Japan’s dependency on middle eastern oil made the country vulnerable to price rise engineered by the states exporting the commodity. Under the realist terms of power and security, Japan would have to find alternatives for minimizing the impact of the oil shock in its economy as a matter of power; and so it did by establishing contracts, such as with Indonesia, for alternative sources of the commodity.

Henceforth, the economic factor is important to realists to the extent that it affects national power and capabilities. “Industrial countries that effectively combine technology with capital, skilled labour, and raw materials, not only enjoy a higher standard of living but also tend to have more leverage in their relations with other states.”[13] 

Furthermore, realists argue that it is desirable for a state to establish a system of dependency than to be dependent on other states. When Japan established the contract of oil drilling in Indonesia, it was intentionally establishing a system of Indonesian dependency on Japanese investments on that country. Another example for the above argument is the case of Brazil and soy production in the Cerrado region: Japan had intentionally heavily invested in massive agricultural production to supply its demands and secure low grain prices after the US embargo of 1973. This intentionally boosted the Brazilian soy production towards dependency on the Japanese market.

Indeed, Tanaka’s intention in Brazil was to offer Japanese aid in projects such as hydroelectric power for aluminium smelter in the Amazon[14], forest and pulp development, plus agricultural and fishery projects.[15] And so, by analysing the motivations behind such projects, we find that in fact Japan was in search for lower prices of raw materials and further expansion of its international markets.

By using the case of Brazil, this essay will discuss Japan’s strategy of securing international markets, search for cheaper raw materials, and strengthening its diplomatic relations during the cold war -- which did not necessarily followed the American prescriptions. In a sense, just like in the Meiji restoration Japan competed with western powers and established its sphere of influence in Asia, in a much milder degree we saw Japan in the cold war challenging the US in the creation of its own sphere of influence through the world.

 

Japanese Foreign Aid in the 1970’s

 

In order to illustrate the above realist framework of analysis, I will bring to light the case of Nipo-Brazilian relationship. By looking at the numbers, we find that in the 1970’s and 1980’s Brazil has received much investment form Japan -- both from the ODA funds and private sector. In a study made by Takao Saeki, it is shown that the Foreign Direct Investment from Japan to Brazil doubled between the decade of 1960 to 1970.[16]  Hasegawa shows in another study that by 1973 Brazil had the fourth world’s largest cumulative face value of Japans aid loans.[17] Thirdly, according to the Central Bank of Brazil, the Japanese total investments and reinvestments in the decade of 1960 was of US$ 110,242 thousand, and by the 1970’s the figure multiplied to US$ 1,503,290 thousand.[18]

      Putting these numbers against a larger picture, we find out that actually the increase of Japanese investments in the 1970’s is observed throughout Latin America. A study done by Yasutomo shows that in 1972, the Japanese ODA to Latin America was of US$ 2,72 million, hence multiplying to US$ 35,24 million in 1973, and continuing to grow to US$ 131,79 in 1978.[19] Therefore the increased aid to Brazil during that period doesn’t represent an abnormality but in fact a general trend that was going on through South America. Furthermore, by looking at the numbers in a global scale, we find that the Japanese aid was also significantly increased in African and Middle Eastern countries.[20]

      The Japanese foreign aid to the above regions, in the specified period, reflects a grand strategy carried out under the terns of resource diplomacy and later on as pat of a comprehensive security program. The purpose of these aid programs can be seen from the following perspectives: (1) economic: increased degree of interdependent relationships and economic cooperation was seen as an effective measure for Japan’s economic security; (2) diplomatic: using the oil embargo as an example, Japan increased its aid to Arab states with the objective to lift the imposed restrictions; (3) strategic: aid as a support to Asian as well as global security objectives called by Japan’s western alliances.[21]

The Japanese interests in South America can be summarized under the above “economic” term. As it is discussed by Anderson, Japanese aid in South America was predominately geared towards natural resources.[22] This means that Japanese aid in South America was especially designed to secure supplies of natural resources and agricultural products to Japan. This was done as part of a strategy of diversification of natural resources suppliers, and to guarantee lower and stable prices among international competitors for the Japanese market.

Henceforth, a secondary aspect of Japanese interests in South America ties to the above “strategic” aid term. This form of aid has a strong relationship with the US range of influence in the region. Although Japan was a US competitor at many levels, it still maintained a carefully planned policy when it came to security concern. Anderson discusses that Japanese aid in South America was carefully planned to not contradict Washington’s interests. For example Japanese aid was more extent in countries farther away from the US borders than to countries near the US border.[23] This is to say that, US has maintained stronger interests in countries near its border than to those located in South America – perhaps with a few exceptions, such as Colombia and Bolivia due to their heavy narcotraffic activities.

At last, we observe that during the oil shock there was a clear challenge from he Japanese to the US interests in the Middle East. So, why was Japan ready to challenge the US in the Middle East, and not so much willing to challenge the US in Latin America?

In order to find the answer to this question we must look carefully at the differences of these two regions: the Middle East and Latin America with a focus on Mexico and Central America. Here we observe different necessities and degrees of strategic, economic and diplomatic importance to Japan as compared to the US. Certainly the pursuit of lifting the embargo was far more important and feasible to Japan than to the US, as Japan was almost entirely dependent on Middle Eastern oil and had no serious conflicts or history of colonialization in the region. But comparatively looking at Mexico and Central America as opposed to South America, we find a far larger availability of resources and potentiality, especially in Brazil against to the countries neighbouring the US. As United States maintained its interest in the countries near its borders, and Japan not having much reason to interfere in the area, it naturally chose to invest in the South Cone. Hence, by taking in account the above analysis, we can say that Japan would challenge the US only when it comes down to the question of natural resources availability. Fortunately, after the oil shock Japan looked into diversifying its sources of natural resources in order to prevent future conflicts with the US or any other opposing threat.  

One aspect that realists haven’t discussed is that desire to avoid conflicts may as well be part of the pool of self-interested actions of a state. To a country that has no standing army and is constitutionally prohibited to engage in war, it may be natural that the pursuit of peace and avoidance of conflict are primary interests. Nevertheless, we cannot discard that Japan being a capitalist state, it may as well engage in competition for international markets and at some instances go against the interest of its long lasting alliance partner the US.  

 

Brazil and Japan Relations: The Immigration Factor

   

      The next question I wish to look into is why Japan chose Brazil in the 1970’s as the primary beneficiary of its investments in South America. Hollerman explains that Japan’s interest in Brazil is linked to the large community of Japanese immigrants and descendents living in that country -- In fact Brazil has the largest expatriate group of ethnic Japanese in the world.[24]

The justification for Hollerman’s argument lies on following rational: (1) because of the diligent character of the members of the Japanese immigrant community and is descendents, most of them have become respected individuals in the Brazilian society; (2) and so the Japanese-Brazilian could provide a strong base of operations for the Japanese interests in Brazil; (3) this enabled Japan’s approach to business in Brazil to be readily arranged.

 This explains just a fraction of the Nipo-Brazilian relations. Hence he next question I propose is: what brought the Japanese at such large quantity to Brazil? The answer lies on the history of Nipo-Brazilian relations. Hence, at the same time we look at that, it is possible to find the gradual construction of Japanese interests of Japan in Brazil:  

 With the fall of Tokugawa Shognate in 1867, the Meiji administration quickly signed a series of treaties with western countries, that together, represented the opening of Japan to foreign trade. Such movement did not only confine itself to relationship with western powers such as the US, England, and also Spain and Russia, but it also extended to minor countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Henceforth, the Japanese government launched missions, such as the Iwakura,  with the specific purposes of signing and ratifying treaties of commerce, educate Japanese scholars in western sciences, technologies and foreign languages and establish embassies throughout the world.

      In 1897 the Japanese embassy was first established in Brazil with Sutemi Chinda as the main figure. Furthermore, by 1892 the Brazilian government had already issued the law that permitted Japanese immigration. And by 1894 the Japanese immigration company Kishisa Imin had set the contract with the Brazilian partner Prado & João to start the Japanese immigration to Brazil.[25]

According to Ninomiya, during that period Japan was experiencing great social tension in its cities, which was caused by a high demographic growth.[26] Grilli explains that the stable condition that Japan lived in Tokugawa period had permitted “significant population growth and urbanization, agricultural innovation and high degree of commercial activity.”[27] With the Meiji restoration, the Japanese government adopted an immigration policy that partially envisioned the alleviation of such social matters in the urban centres by sending specialized workers to foreign countries.

By looking at the Brazilian coffee industry, we can find the explanation for the initial Japanese attraction to Brazil. At the turn of the twentieth century, Brazil was one of the top coffee producers in the world, and due to a shortage of labour, the plantations were welcoming foreign immigrants for work in the fields.[28] In fact the first attempt of establishing immigration between Japan in Brazil was done in 1984, less than one year before the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce and Navigation was signed among the countries. In this respect, the Japanese government was interested alleviating the high population density in its cities, giving opportunity for work and enrichment to his population, by issuing temporary immigration contracts at overseas lands, and further contributing to the internationalisation of Japan.

Nonetheless, it is true that until the end of WWI, the preferred destination of Japanese immigrants was the United States. After the war, several immigration regulations were imposed culminating in the 1924 law that prohibited Japanese immigration to the US. Meanwhile working contracts were signed with Brazilian coffee farms to bring more Japanese immigrants to work in the fields. Hence, due to plenty of opportunity for work, and a peaceful condition (taking in consideration the war-devasted regions of the world and the animosity of the North Americans), Brazil gradually became the most popular destination of Japanese immigrants. Today Brazil has the largest population of Japanese decedents outside Japan – a community of roughly 1.5 million people.[29]

 

Nipo-Brazilian Relations in the 1970’s

 

 

      The relationship between the Japanese presence in Brazil and agroindustry has never faded since the early coffee plantation workers, up to today’s large scale soy production, rice and vegetable plantations. Nevertheless we cannot ignore the presence of numerous Japanese kogaisha in Brazil, a good number of sogo shosha operating in the trade between Japan and Brazil, and several joint ventures – totalizing more than 500 in the 1970’s.[30] Among such companies was Fishiba textile industry  (US$ 23,235 thousand in 1975); NEC communication equipments (US$ 9,060 thousand), but virtually holding a monopoly on steel production and ship building was Ishikawajima-Harima in partnership with the Brazilian Usiminas (respectively steel and shipbuilding: US$ 44,863 and US$ 241,561).[31]

      When Tanaka Kakuei visited Brazil, he promised aid and investments on several projects, which included the development of hydroelectric power for aluminum smelter projects in eth Amazon, forest and pulp development projects, plus agricultural and fishery projects. Consequently, the Brazilian president Geisel visited Japan in 1976 to negotiate with Takeo Miki about the Japanese cooperation in the construction of an aluminum complex in Belém; the support for the construction of the Tubarão steel mill; the Cenibra and Flonibra forestry and pulp; help the expansion of Usiminas steel mill; development of iron mines; joint ventures for export of iron pellets, and the agricultural development program of the Cerrado.[32]

      These massive investments were topped off with the agreement that “the two nations would cooperate in science and technology, that Japan would provide export credits for the financing of Brazilian purchases of equipment and capital goods from Japan, and that long-term commercial contracts would be arranged for the export Brazilian raw materials and food to Japan.”[33]

      From the projects mentioned above, I feel the necessity to highlight a couple of them to exemplify the Japanese self-interested investment in Brazil: Cerrado and Carajás. The Cerrado region, which corresponds to almost the size of the Amazon,[34] was envisioned together by the Brazilian and Japanese governments as potentially the world’s largest agricultural frontier. It took four years of planning between the initial propose of Tanaka Kakuei to Geisel, and the begging of soy production destine to Japanese and other international markets. As a matter of figures, by 1976 Brazil was the eighth largest soy producer in the world, which after Japanese investments, Brazil became second only after the United States. Furthermore, as of 1997, Japan is the third largest consumer of Brazilian soy in the world.[35]

      The second example of Japanese self-interest initiatives in Brazil is the Carajás project. This project is based in the Amazon region and covers roughly an area of 1,900 square miles. Carajás corresponds to a complex number of individual projects that range from pulp production, mineral extraction (the world’s largest reserve of iron ore), aluminum smelting and timber extraction. While 51% of the shares of the project were owned by the Brazilian government, Japan was the biggest outside investor.[36] In an interview with Mr. Batista (Carajás project coordinator, also award-winning of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Sacred Treasure by the Emperor Hirohito) he mentioned that: “Carajás is the most important link between Japan and Brazil… [it] can provide cheap mineral plus energy to … Japan. Carajás is the opposite of OPEC. It is designed to reduce, not to raise the price of raw materials….”[37]

 

Conclusion

 

Japan’s success in large-scale investment in Brazil, as initially explained by Hollerman, was partially due the presence of a large Japanese community that helped facilitating the Japanese business’ penetration. But certainly that was not the only reason why Japan cared to invest in Brazil so heavily after the oil shock. Other factors also included: (1) the geographic features of Brazil, with its immense size, and abundant natural resources; (2) the fact of Brazil being the world’s eighth largest economy, and therefore playing a significant role in the international market; (3) plus, the Brazilian government’s willingness to engage in pharaonic development projects financed by foreign capital closely matched the interests of the Japanese.[38]

As the Japanese multinational companies and foreign aid advanced into Brazil, one could follow a clear picture of interests: to guarantee the availability of natural resources at lower cost to Japan, and trade with Japan (Japanese) products made at lower prices in Brazil. As it was previously analyzed in this essay, Japanese self-interests of diversification of natural resource suppliers was the main motivation for such advancement. However, one cannot ignore that Brazil also greatly benefited from the Japanese investments; and by no means Brazil should be considered a victim of power struggle between the world’s top economies.

Brazil benefited much from the development of infrastructure in its frontier areas, such as the Amazon and Cerrado, with broad economical implications.[39] Also, the transfer of technology form Japan to Brazil, rather done by the private sector or official organs such as JICA, has much benefited the advancement of Brazilian industry until the present date.

      But there is one aspect that leaves Brazil seriously harmed from the advancement of Japanese interests in the 1970’s: the environment. Much of the large-scale development projects sponsored by Japanese capital in Brazil have left a trail of environmental depletion which might take generations to recover. Today there is much discussion about the implementation of sustainable agriculture in the Cerrado region, while lobby groups composed of agrobusiness lords, Brazilian governmental officials and foreign market demands won’t compromise with the necessary environmental measures of preservation on the region.[40]

      Ozawa explains that because Japan had a large domestic economic growth in the 1970’s. “Japan’s dependence on overseas resources has risen enormously. Japanese industry must [have had to] secure vital supplies of industrial resources abroad. At the same time it [was] quite willing to transfer overseas resource-processing activities (such a aluminum smelting, steelmaking, and oil refining) whose further growth in Japan [was] no longer as strongly desired as in the past or simply impractical because of import and environmental constraints.”[41]

      Ironically, an environmental report produced by the Japan International Cooperation Agency reveals that due to the Carajás project, much forest was cleared out for the construction of roads and railways, plus 2,400 km² of rainforest was submerged for the construction of the very hydroelectric power plant destined for aluminum smelting with vast Japanese investment.[42] Moreover, today Japan’s ODA to Brazil has as its number one concern the environmental causes. The Japanese government recognizes that Brazilian environmental problems have global repercussion, and it emphasizes the importance of the Amazon and urgent need for its protection.[43]

      Now, the question that lingers in the air is that if environmental concern constitutes a Japanese interest in realist terms. More likely so. By considering the environmental international initiatives that Japan has started or joined (Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Environmental Programme), and looking at the importance given to sustainable policies in major corporations (Toyota, Sony, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and so on) we might find the traces that lead to self-interest and power play in contemporary Japanese politics.

      Summarizing, it is a difficult task to identify the essence of the political culture of Japan. Moreover, it is easier to start with a biased concept, with a sound theoretical base, and try to apply it to a number of consistent instances in order to test its validity. My bias was the realist school of international relations, and because of that I could assume that Japan’s aid quest in the 1970 was a matter of extension of power. Nonetheless, a clear picture of the political culture of Japan is composed of several layers of analysis, rather then a collection of few poorly elaborated points of view. Therefore the values that have permeated through this essay are subject to reevaluation, and so the interpretation of the instances can be done differently.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

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