On Heidegger’s Authenticity. Perplexity of Ontological Guidance

Klement Mitterpach
Department of Philosophy,
Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
(República de Eslovaquia)

Recibido: 17/03/2015
Revisado: 03/04/2015
Aprobado: 13/05/2015

RESUMEN
La cuestión del ser y el concepto de la cuota de la autenticidad de una reputación de los presupuestos más palpables desacreditado del pensamiento de Heidegger. El artículo trata de presentar una explicación de ambas cuestiones fuera del marco de esta reputación, así como la referencia estándar para el discurso analítico existencial. Examina la correlación que Heidegger desarrolla entre la ontología de autenticidad rendido como el desarrollo de la auténtica ontología. La cuestión de la autenticidad es crucial para entender la idea de Heidegger, de la práctica filosófica explicativo, en lugar de representar su idea del hombre o un desvío antropológico hacia la cuestión del ser mismo. Para evitar los fallos y llegar a términos con la cuenta de la autenticidad de Heidegger y la cuestión del ser, el artículo sigue una de las menores observaciones de Heidegger, lo "óntico" sobre el Dasein auténtico y nuestra explicación del cambio notable en su relación con el mundo, lo que podría reunir bajo la frase "como si nada hubiera sucedido". Tratamos de leer la autenticidad de Heidegger, de manera anversa "como si algo ha sucedido", frase que indica un cambio desde la promulgación esperada de cambio que ha surgido cuando radicalizamos la sospecha de que nada sucedió. Usamos la frase como ejemplo para entender la decisión como una revelación paradójica de lo que ha decidido. La ontología es reveladora de la (no reflejada) transformación promulgada, la transformación como el modo "más propio" de la situación en sí -es la ontología de esta explicación-. Ésta se vuelve cuestionable cuando decide derivar su propio significado del simple hecho de su propia existencia. La autenticidad es simplemente
una agencia generada por la ontología que describe la orientación de la propia agencia descriptiva.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Heidegger-autenticidad-la cuestión del ser-explicación ontológica-acontecimiento-el cambio-la decisión.

ABSTRACT
The question of being and the concept of authenticity share a reputation of the most palpably discredited presuppositions of Heidegger’s thinking. The article attempts to present an explication of both issues outside the frame of this reputation as well as standard reference to existential analytic discourse. It examines the correlation Heidegger develops between ontology of authenticity rendered as development of authentic ontology. The issue of authenticity is crucial for understanding Heidegger’s idea of explanatory philosophical practice, rather than representing Heidegger’s idea of man, or an anthropological detour towards the question of being itself. To avoid the failures in coming into terms with Heidegger’s account of authenticity and the question of being, the article follows one of Heidegger’s minor “ontic” remarks about the authentic Dasein and our expectation of the noticeable change in his relation to the world, which could be gathered under the phrase “as if nothing has happened”. We try to read Heidegger’s authenticity from it positive obverse “as if something has happened” as a phrase which indicates a shift from the expected enactment of change to the change which has emerged when we radicalize the suspicion that nothing has in fact happened. We use the phrase as exemplary for understanding the decision as a paradoxical revelation of what has been decided. Ontology is revelatory of the enacted (not reflected) transformation, the transformation as the “ownmost” mode of the situation of explication itself – it is the ontology of this explication. The explication becomes questionable when it decides to derive its own meaning from the simple fact of its own existence. Authenticity is simply an agency generated by the ontology which describes the guidance of the descriptive agency itself.


Disqualification of the philosophical
Interpretations of Heidegger’s explication of existential authenticity must more or less deal with presupposition, according to which it represents a modestly formulated ethical concept inserted into the fundamental ontological frame of the question of being itself. The question of being and the concept of authenticity nevertheless share a reputation of the most palpably discredited presuppositions of Heidegger’s thinking. Although they are commonly accepted as methodologically significant guidelines of Heidegger’s philosophy, they are more or less disrespected even by Heideggerian followers, who at least accept
Heidegger’s own critical comments on Being and Time (BT) project and follow its later re-appropriation in Heidegger’s “historical” thinking. The question of being to be answered or formulated through the project of existential analytic is besides often reported to be discredited by Heidegger himself (confession of the failure of the project of Being and Time) and the issue of authenticity - no matter how ambiguous it might appear or how far we are willing to meet Heidegger’s recommendation to stand the perplexity as an inevitable effect of the experience of each truly primordial phenomenon - is supposed to be disqualified by his political engagement. It is believed to be “just enough” to suspect authentically based ontology of supporting ethically debased action, which can no longer be considered only an “ontical” misunderstanding, or Heidegger’s misrecognition of the true nature of the historical event (advent of Nazism in Germany), but is to be considered a disqualification of its ontological meaning, and therefore a sign that any self-declared “politically neutral” philosophical attempt to ontologically ground an original explanation of the authenticity itself is morally invalid.

We could infer that in both cases (question of being and authenticity) the disqualification is supposed to function as the revelatory force proper, the force Heidegger had not mastered by his explanatory work itself, and finally, as the force which reads his thinking from without any respect to the claim on authenticity Heidegger would ontologically rely on. It should be nevertheless assumed that it is precisely Heidegger himself who pursues the analysis of the idea of authenticity rather than posits the idea of authenticity to become the ground of an ethical attitude. Therefore, it is certainly not enough to ask about Heidegger’s “idea of authenticity”, unless we don’t survey his idea of ontological-existential analytics.

The suspicion thus concerns not only the ontology (existential analytic) of the authentic but also the authenticity of his idea of fundamental ontology as a way to answering/formulating the question of being.\(^1\) Is

\(^1\) It should be remarked that these two issues are not pushed aside or deposited to the history of philosophy solely for the reasons more or less connected with Heidegger’s political engagement after Being and Time. The problem with existential understanding and fundamental ontology (question of being) starts the moment Heidegger formulates these as totally misrecognized tasks which had signified the dimension of philosophical positing of problems, which were inaccessible to the former idea of the nature of philosophy and its field of study. We could therefore say that Heidegger starts with the project of existential analytics and fundamental ontology well aware of his position – he does not naively attempt to return the big philosophical ambitions of the past, but decides to measure the contemporary criticism and diminishing prospects of philosophy by an ontological standards applied to the singular and historical existence. Therefore, Heidegger could be said to „ontologize” Kierkegaardian existence, just because he knew that the great criticism does not leave but transforms the question. However, the point is, Heidegger does not work out a naive ontology but an ontology of naivety, or naive indifference, which goes as far as philosophical and at the same time he reads the failure of philosophy in the 20th century as the final fulfilment of the metaphysical thinking. He definitely
Heidegger’s question of being to be treated as a theoretical problem, or is it to be expected to appear only as a key phrase, the meaning of which (not only the meaning of being) is to come out together with an authentic understanding and praxis of theory (just discovered and perhaps re-initiated by phenomenological breakthrough)? The critical view in any case has to be targeted at the idea of authentic philosophy, the true *Wissenschaft* of his early courses, which generates the acuteness of the ontological problem. Does existential ontology only describe the nature of being human or it also embodies an authentic philosophy? Therefore, at the same time it is no less obvious that such disqualification of authentically grounded philosophy, strictly philosophically grounded philosophy, is possible only in case we had already believed that it is precisely the philosophy dedicated to authenticity that was supposed to have no political results at all, or no dangerous political results, unless it betrays its demand on authenticity itself. The disqualification of authenticity in philosophical discourse is therefore believed to be a disqualification of philosophy which had turned political precisely when sticking to nothing else than philosophy itself.

**Is authentic ontology to be the ontology of authenticity?**

To put it simply: what is Heidegger after? A scholarly problem of the concept of being or an answer to the question what is man in itself? Does the problem of “self” appear only as an indispensable passage to the problem of being or is it precisely the proper problem which can be delineated only indirectly by positing the (philosophical) task of the question of being? Is Heidegger after a theory of being – a task of a particular discipline called philosophy – or is he willing to show that in order to develop the proper comportment to one’s self we need to go as far as the ontological – apparently distinctly theoretical and scholarly – problem? These questions as straight, justified and simplifying as they seem to be, however, display naiveté of what one could call “a drive towards practice”, an urge towards fixation of certain practical attitude one is apt to
hold when for different reasons all the contemporary experienced wisdom is suspended and philosophy has by itself succumbed to the drive towards its own desperate justification. The idea of the fundamental meanings of being which pervade our everyday comportment, regardless of our conscious approval or declarative repudiation of their reach, is what makes Heidegger a challenge for philosophy, even though from the standpoint of traditional philosophical ontologies he seems to give us nothing but philosophical explication of the thoroughly ambiguous subject, and seems to represent an exemplary speculative illusion from the view of the post-metaphysical philosophical criticism. The challenge is even bigger if we consider that Heidegger’s explanation is apparently no challenge for the common sense, since it obviously does not communicate in its language. Moreover, it seems to give us nothing but the ideal of the “deeply banal” and “content poor” authenticity typical of the modern diffused cynicism (Sloterdijk, 2001, pp. 195), where we would expect to have the construction filled with particular meaning or aim. Is Heidegger proposing an ontology instead of an ethical stance and ethical stance where philosophers would expect nothing but ontology?

One could be tempted to look for the answer in Heidegger’s own delineations and methodological proposals, or to be more historically precise, in development of his early motivations. However, Heidegger develops all the ontology of authenticity as a development of authentic ontology, whatever it leads to, or whatever it could happen to appear to mean. So, if we believe it is nothing but a purely academic philosophical problem, one must be ready to discover this idea an indispensable part of practical everyday engagement. On the other hand, what philosophers believed to be a practical side of philosophical theoretical work can appear as an outcome of a thwarted ontological background ordinarily dismissed as purely theoretical, isolated and reserved for a strictly schooled professional view of philosophers by occupation. The authenticity therefore signifies an attempt for a disclosing breakthrough into the possibility of philosophy, which is developed not only to release its own standards, but is also expected not to miss the perplexity of its guidance in no less than ontological terms.

2 „However, it does not shed a good light on the relationship of existential philosophy to real existence when only "one's own death" occurs to it when it is asked what it has to say about real life. Actually, it says that it has nothing to say – and to this end it must write nothing with a capital N. This paradox characterizes the enormous movement of thought in Sein und Zeit: Such a great wealth of concepts was hardly ever employed before to convey a content so "poor" in the mystical sense. The work beseeches the reader with a lofty call to authentic existence but veils itself in silence when one wants to ask, How then?“ (Sloterdijk, 2001, p.207)
Heidegger is after the question what philosophy is after and his “strategy” is one of letting the question itself evolve, show up, release its own language. The problem with Heidegger’s language, however, does not rest in the standard belief or observation according to which Heidegger violently processes language outside the standards of commonsensical reasoning and intelligibility. The same, however, holds for a standard view of the philosopher, who believes to observe the language which does no longer respond to the standards of objective language, due to kind of circling around a structure of something that resembles a well-founded theoretical object only by name. The fact is, paradoxically, Heidegger’s approach could be said to lead the philosophical language as if it was an ordinary one, simply following the objectives of the task by sticking to the rule of a commonsensical observer who is only expected to remember, that the thing called “being” is to be followed methodologically provisionally as the completeness (Ganzheit), the whole itself present in each particular moment of the structure. It shows this way that it is precisely not the peculiarity of the language itself but the commonsensical observers´ customary simplifications which come into view to be identified as basic metaphysical constructive ideas Heidegger reveals as the significant epochal keywords constituting the epochally structured history of being.

The non-philosophical common-sense has its ways of dealing with the deliberately sustained vagueness of its own leading ideas, if we assume that reflecting on our customary use of language, which is always already in service of philosophical attitude, it structures the vagueness itself historically, affirms the difference but nevertheless renders it within the most neutral ambivalent structure – that of history. (Everyone knows there are “times” different from our contemporaneity, however, these are precisely historical). The historical in the sense has no incomprehensible meaning, though has one which definitely prevents us from following its explication in terms of the commonsensical language, which is supposed to guard the shared idea of its communicative purpose and its function of vehicle of the reference to the historical past.

The point is, that „being“ is found on the way as that which is pre-philosophically misleading for philosophy which starts its history with positing a determinate conceptual background as well as represents an unexpected affirmation of the agent of an emblematic rhetorical over-generalization called “being”. If Descartes´ cogito is to be taken as an operation of an “idiot”, the unschooled “private thinker” who at any case is able to perform the simple authentification of the evidence of being conscious (Deleuze/Guattari, 1994, p. 61-2), it is “being” that represents a testing example for experiencing the art of a paradigmatic
philosophical entanglement (Wittgenstein). However, does not Heidegger, to risk an utter over-simplification, emphatically affirm being as the token of indifference towards the matter of philosophy in order to diagnose its condition and to release philosophy from its “philosophical” entanglement as well as from its practicist responsibility to the common demand of the useful?

Heidegger does a very simple, though since the very beginning a rather intricate step: he introduces what philosophy is actually after explicitly as “ontological”, and for this reason he dedicates philosophy to the pursuit of the meaning of being, and not vice versa. Everyone would more or less agree about examples of ontological categories, concepts representing examples of ontological items to be dealt with in the field. It is as if the standard common idea about ontology as the study, having to do something with being itself, is put into the task seriously aimed precisely on what it is said to be in its title while bracketing off all particular historical identification of its contents. It is surprising how unexpectedly alienating with respect to the idea of philosophical theoretical practice this gesture finally becomes even though it seems to simply follow the core ideas of western metaphysics. The indifference towards the perplexity of the philosophical praxis of questioning (question of being) as well as towards the guidance indifferently accepted seem to share the same agent, which cannot be distinguished along the lines of the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers, between the philosophy and the common-sense. Does Heidegger’s difference between authentic and inauthentic provide us with the idea of agency that escapes the division?

From what has been said, the agent is being as such, exemplifying the indifferent point of reference in both cases and therefore being identified as the guiding word of the philosophical questioning, which at the same time appears indifferent towards the historical indifference of philosophy as a particular practice. The indifference therefore is no longer pertaining to non-philosophers, but appears as such precisely as a part of the philosophical attitude towards philosophy itself. Heidegger definitely makes use of this vague understanding of the “indifference towards understanding”, an attitude he not only deems false but also shows to be in fact ontologically indispensable. The indifference toward understanding itself has been traditionally philosophically excluded, bereft of any philosophical (ontological) relevance, and it can happen to emerge at all only as the point of departure of a focused ontological explanation.

Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is often rather implicitly than explicitly put aside as a consequent exposure of the trap of the question of being, the theoretical as well as ethical nihilism of the whole BT project. The standard reproach of Heideggerians towards Heidegger’s critics had usually called for paying
more justice and attention to Heidegger’s own text, for actually studying Heidegger rather than doing with an image of his attitude or his statements deprived of their contextual and methodological background. However, the critical reception of the idea of authenticity does not as much fail in not reading closely enough but more likely in not responding to the problem Heidegger exposed as a new type of theoretical task, or if we want, exposed the task of philosophy in a way which does not coincide with its standard traditional formulations or its methodological assumptions and last but not least, with the idea of its communal presence. What usually seems to be left implicitly undisputed is precisely the question, what kind of answer does Heidegger’s existential analytics represent. We should therefore ask, what is it Heidegger describes on the man, rather than ask what is a man in Heidegger’s thought, if not finally examine under what circumstances does a human being appear as a matter of ontological determination. Heidegger is thus usually analyzed along the lines of standards which he overtly refuses, moreover, is misread even if we join his program, no matter how far we understand our position and intentions as critical, interrogative or just pursuing the direction of his thought. Therefore the implicit is to be sought in our expectations rather than in the text, which with regard to them is rather over-explicit.

The authenticity could be an exemplary example, as far as the most ambiguous thing about it is the role it is supposed to play, or plays in BT, within the development of the task of the question of being. The standard reproaches point to its negativity, emptiness, fake pathos and lack of explication being on par with the lack of meaning of the whole of analytics, which is overtly irrespective to science as well as to the commonsensical and moral questions, which in the course of BT are constantly identified as not factically but principally misrecognizing the task of the analytics as well as its own role within it. However, it needs to be emphasized that the issue of authenticity is crucial for understanding Heidegger’s idea of explanatory philosophical practice, his existential analytics, rather than representing Heidegger’s idea of man, or an anthropological detour towards the question of being itself. Even though we admit Heidegger’s explicit Auseinandersetzung (“confrontation”){3} with anthropology, as readers of BT we come across its stubborn insistence which resurfaces each time one attempts to summarize, gather the distinctive contents of Heidegger’s philosophical position. The authenticity issue in BT exemplifies precisely such seizure of the idea of the question of being and its indebtedness to existential analytics or to understanding being, as well as

---

{3} For the translation and the analysis of the multiple meanings intertwined within the word see for example (Bambach, 2005, p. 255-256).
gives an opportunity to meet with the perplexity of our best assumptions, even those of the dedicated close readers or philosophers who sympathize with the program. The issue of authenticity therefore does not correlate with the idea of the question of man, or his most truly ethical way of being, but exemplifies what it means to take being into account in its own right. At the same time it shows the case prepared to “explode” the meaning of that “in its own right”, its “Eigentlichkeit” (authenticity) into its most uncanny. In this sense the so called “resoluteness of Dasein” signifies the condition which bears no significance for someone asking about the nature of human being. Even though we are given the answer we are not able to recognize as an answer at all, we are also given the opportunity to experience number of questions which are attached to the theoretical assumptions about standards of a recognizable answer.

As if something has happened

Heidegger himself explicitly follows these questions and our explanation in this contribution should follow precisely this part of Heidegger’s explication in BT. It is obvious that Heidegger’s account of authenticity as well as our attitude towards the validity and relevance of his explication, is inevitably tested by very simple set of questions concerned with the conative potential of the authentic individual, and therefore, taking the possibility of authentically grounded action as the point of difference, from where one could judge the real difference of the authentic being. It is symptomatic that, no matter how strongly one opts for Heidegger’s program, it is the idea itself that calls for confrontation with this sense of judging the potential of Heidegger’s question of being as a whole. With respect to that, one could notice that the indifference towards being aims precisely on the question of how to deal with ontology and authenticity, no matter how philosophically insightfully one pairs these two terms together.

The instructiveness of Heidegger’s guiding comments on what the resoluteness seems to work as negative support for reminding us the basic structural claims to be met by existential analysis of Dasein. However, the
supportive preclusiveness of Heidegger’s guiding remarks could be of more immediate relevance than methodologically properly elevated guidewords and structures which keep the positive ontological explication of authentic Dasein moving.

Heidegger’s remarks basically tend to illustrate what Dasein is rather then explain what it means to be a resolute Dasein. We could even say, that this shift is not only accidental and provisional, but shows the move that has been taken when the question of being had been announced. To explain it from this point, resoluteness shows Dasein from not only structural but also an evental point of view. Even though Heidegger’s remarks do not explicitly introduce the issue of event, it is precisely the “eventual” resoluteness which comes to the view of a practicist critical attitude. To loosely paraphrase the point of one of the paragraphs⁴, nothing in the world changes and yet all the comportments of Dasein are determined now from the point of its ownmost “potentiality-of-being-a-self” (Selb-sein-können). We could say it works “as if nothing has happened”. The point is that we say this, only in cases something actually has happened, although only in case it has become obvious precisely by nothing having changed at all. We could say that such happening is apparent precisely in cases when nothing changes, or when expecting something to change and desperately looking for the proof or sign of the change one overlooks the peace as the sign of something to have happened. To be more phenomenologically precise, happening itself is present only in its absence, in absence of any particular suspicion about it, except the one present when letting nothing in particular to happen. This “as if nothing has happened” is basically equal to a positively determined “as if something has happened” pronounced in case we sense the change of no particular origin or no particular sign of, and nonetheless, the announcement is made without any pretense to doubt. On the contrary, it expresses certitude without any apparent grounding. It refers to what is explicit and as such expected to be commonly understood precisely without any further demand on verification to prove and explain the common evidence of the meaning of such statements. Avoiding any deliberately inappropriate and superfluous religious or mystical shifts of the positivity of such phenomenal or “eventual” evidence, the phenomenal features of such statements refer to could possibly help us to understand the meaning of Heidegger’s authenticity as resoluteness and resoluteness as the ownmost truth of Dasein.

⁴ “But authentic disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the discoveredness of "world" grounded in it and the disclosedness of being-with with others. The "world" at hand does not become different as far as "content," the circle of the others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward things at hand which understands and takes care of things, and the concerned being-with with the others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 274).
Heidegger advances by reminding us that resoluteness as the authentic being self does not detach us from his/her world. Apart from an obvious concession to the idea of modern subjectivity to be demonstrated from the point of existential analytics as utterly misleading, we could read this as a further affirmation of what has been said before. There is no change, not even the one of separating us from the world. It would possibly suggest consciousness itself to be the place of the profound change which leaves the outer world intact. The idea of change which must have happened even though nothing in particular has been changed points to the disclosed whole precisely due to the absence of any particular change. One could be even tempted to determine the whole adverbially as “disclosed differently”, “disclosed in a new way” etc. Instead of identifying resoluteness with different state of mind or order of things, we could speak of change of no change or change without the change. The task then is not that of becoming aware of changes or looking for the reason one has been made to do so, but that of the appearance of change itself. “As if something has happened” sounds like an illusion from the realm of “feelings” and vague “intuitions”: a pure appearance of change where there was actually none. However, we have used it in different sense, which, besides, we are quite familiar with: no particular change and despite the change which is can put all the particularity in difference to the change itself as its condition of appearance, as the “nothing” which cannot be attached to anything in particular and despite is ascribed to all there is in its “not changing at all”. In fact, it says, as if it was “something” which has changed, although we refer to the change itself as to the only “thing” which has actually occurred. The phrase becomes even ominous, admonitory or at least revealing once we use it to comment on someone’s words which unexpectedly distract the situation for no apparent reason. Nothing but the change itself, the fact that “it has happened” as something which is referred to as “nothing in particular”, something that stands for the change which is always about to receive the role of a subject only in order to allow to shift our attention to the “has happened” as the true core of the meaning of the phrase in order to avoid the direct identification of the agency – all this is to manifest the simple fact of its uncompromising finality. It is the finality of the appearance that comes to the fore and is reported, witnessed, and not to be missed precisely by such ambiguous and vague, although truly determinate saying, which points to a precise situation of the appearance of the “unchanging” itself being sustained by the change of its coming to the fore.

---

5 As authentic being a self, resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than authentically being-in-the-world? (Heidegger, 1996, p. 274)
What if we try to read Heidegger’s authenticity from “as if something has happened” as a phrase which indicates a shift from the expected enactment of change to the change which has emerged when we radicalize the suspicion that nothing has in fact happened? The radicalization does not only exaggerate what goes counter to our expectation, but shows that we have been actually “decided”, not just “determined”, but determined in the sense of “having been decided”, that means, having been confronted with the significance of determinations, the significance of their appearance “on the background” of the decisive change.

To decide for what has been decided

“As if something has happened” indicates a change which is understood/experienced as final in the sense of not only having already happened, but of the decisiveness itself having already happened, which in fact is the single determinative evidence of the happening itself. The finality of such happening is the finality of change which has been discovered as having been enacted by an agency, which although being experienced as foreign, has already come out as decisive. It is decisive, because it pertains to “me”. It can actually step to the fore only as “me” although “me” unrecognized. It appears precisely only as that which is “to be kept unrecognized” and in this mode falls inevitably to “me”. It calls for its common (also philosophically common) determinations which have been definitely deprived of their immediacy. The other “me” calls therefore to disclose all the commonsensical as well as philosophical suggestions about the “self” as former identifications which have been drawn upon regards different than the one occupied by the ontologically emptied meaning of the “self”. The “authentic” me therefore does not designate an ideal of a certain type of human perfection, not even a drive towards my “original” me. It rather exemplifies the decisive possibility of the disclosure of the “self” which keeps itself alien to the familiar ways of appropriation of the “self” into “my-self”.

The identification of the “mineness” of the happening is not supplementary, but is precisely what falls on me as to be decided. The decisiveness of the change is what is significant as far it is precisely not “me” who has changed, although it is precisely me who has been enacted by the change. As far as the change has no particular origin, it is the source of its decisiveness as the mode of significance which appeals only to the being which identifies and recognizes happening and change within the structure of origination. Therefore
the “as if” of the happening is precisely a manifestation of the decisiveness, not expression of doubt. The decisiveness of the “as if” reveals the whole phrase to be an expression of the impossible and therefore revealing likeness with something that has caused all to change at once, which nevertheless is the way we address that kind of change.

Having a significance of something that has been decided eventuates only as a decisiveness which is not actually “my” own, although as decisively as it comes to the fore as an agency, it cannot be ascribed (appropriated) to any particular agency. Heidegger’s analytics of conscience in this point pursues the task of exemplifying the agency, by providing us with an example of something which belongs to us although it displays itself as if coming from anywhere else than from us. In its content it does nothing less than reveals, that it is precisely “us”. However, it indicates the “me” which I cannot simply “identify” myself with, but which I can only “decide” for, admitting the authentic “self”, deciding for it as “mine”, that is, admitting its “to-be-decided-for” groundlessness.

The authenticity must be misrecognized in its significance and its theoretical, ontological meaning, once we adopt the idea of decision as an instantaneous act. Decisions always show what exceeds the moment of decision-making, the instant of decision. Decision is what must be done precisely because it decides about what has been decided – it cannot leave this part and must therefore propose itself an act to be done in the open clear space one installs himself in by erasure of the “having-been-decided” itself. It clearly points to the agency taken over by „me“, as “mine” and therefore to be met with – not to be self-reflectively consciously realized, but precisely enacted by me. The authentic means that which can only be enacted not reflected, moreover, not even reflected as having been done. The past decision cannot be found by a reflection either, they must reappear in a repeated decision and in respect to that.

To want to decide means: what has happened turned out to be decisive for making us decide for what cannot be taken into account in a straightforward reflective act of consciousness. It means to find oneself deciding for what has been decided, that is what has come out to be the very own measure of a decision. The measure is likely to as “if something has happened”: the decision makes us decide for what has not been taken into account and becomes apparent in the decision itself. Precisely that is the reason it is “eventual” in character.

The “having-been-ness” of a decision does not indicate anything to occur “before”, but all “to be” determined in its meaning. Authenticity just names the determination one has to decide for, that is, as the
ultimate, because it does not rely on transcendental standards and it allows us no compromising standards. It is ultimate, because it does not rest in choosing what, but choosing the disclosedness itself. One can only find himself as already “having it had determined” (decided), ultimately as the condition he has found himself in. Therefore, one can say the situation of “as if something has happened” means something which has been decided as that which is to be determined by no other way than by the decision.

**Ontological determination?**

Calling on for the description of decision in terms of being does not pertain only to a tradition which besides other things deals with the concept of being ambiguously. In fact, to become aware of the significance of being as the subject of the key question to be asked in philosophy, one would expect the existential analytics to perform the descriptive legitimation of the existential significance of the decision about philosophy to be pursued, in Heidegger’s case, articulated as the task of the question of being. However, is not the role of existential analytics miscomprehended when subjected to this obligation?

Heidegger’s treatment of the death and conscience as phenomena shows these phenomena as being used to give existential analytic a phenomenal ground. They are not used to prove existential analytic, but to demonstrate from where one has to commence, if the existential analytic is to prove to be an ontological explanation, that is, if it is supposed to be relevatory of the meaning of ontology itself. However, the issue of authenticity raises an expectation which seems to complicate the methodologically straightforward idea of an ontologically appropriate point of departure. The point is, authenticity is not ethically, but ontologically relevant. By its means we have used to pick up, elevate what is to be constitutive of the “ontological”. With respect to the traditional understanding of ontology as a certain level of description of its subjects, one could say, that with Heidegger it is ontology itself to be revealed by explication of the subjectivation we are performing as “beings”, who do not “hesitate” to appropriate their “being-ness” itself. Existential analytics simply raises the authenticity as the subject to be determined, once the idea of ontological explanation is radicalized with respect to its possible subject. What is thus found is named “ontological” as far as it is described in terms which no longer indicate their meanings but their function in philosophical discourse. In this sense, it is the task of finding a way to describe authenticity in terms of its being, not in terms of its meaning. There also lies the difference between the idea of the authenticity to be applied as a morally regulative idea and the authenticity as the idea of explication which is focused on what constitutes the
distinctive “subject” of the question of being. Death or conscience therefore do not function as determinations of a being which is called Dasein, but as determinations of “being revealed”, which due to these phenomena is supposed to be revealed in mode of ontological indifference of its particular meanings. These are elevated to test the ontological relevance of authenticity as an echo of the “eigentlichkeit” of the explication which is to reveal nothing else than what it had started with: the significantly insignificant “being” as the subject of ontological explication.

Ontology is revelatory of the transformation, the transformation as the “ownmost” mode of explication devoted to its own meaning, which, however, is questionable when it decides to derive this meaning from the simple fact of its existence. Authenticity is simply a subject generated by the ontology which describes the very own of the descriptive agency itself. The concessions to the idea of the agency of explication, being exemplified as “man”, “human”, or even “Dasein”, shows that the idea of hermeneutic situation (the being of the explication as such), has not pointed towards the idea of “man”, or “human being”, but Aristotle’s treatises on ethic, physics and metaphysics, which elevate the subject as the situation of the description and its correlated beings. Heidegger reads Aristotle to get to the original Aristotelian disclosure of this agency and to find a differentiated happening of several modes of comportment toward beings instead. By pinpointing to being, Heidegger not only believes to reopen the practice of Aristotelian ontology, philosophy, ontological explication, but he also shows that such regard can open itself only as a misinterpretation of the aim that has remained unrecognized precisely due to the Aristotelian success.

Ontology as a theoretical description however nevertheless describes simply who we are, but in a very special way. It describes us deliberately and inevitably from the point of reference which – to be obedient to the idea of making us explicit from one’s own source of determinations – deserves to keep its (one’s own) meaning open to determination. This way it can pursue what is meant by ontological, by ontology. In this sense the authentic does not serve one to demonstrate oneself. Becoming the conscience of others, as Heidegger reminds us (Heidegger, 1996, p. 274), one does not manifest the authenticity as the public subject, because authenticity cannot be communicated in a rhetorical form as a demand, a claim, not even as a challenge or an imperative. Therefore, it is not the idea of ontological explication to demand the change; it rather explains the structure and the ontology of change, whatever is demanded. To be responsive to what one has not demanded and to be decisive about ourselves being this way is the “thing” (situation) which, once we attempted to describe it, releases our own determinations.
Ontological determination is the choice we are called to make. It does not mean that we are called to do existential analytics or ontological explication of the meaning of being. It means that the choice we have as the final one, the one which depends clearly and thoroughly on our determination, depends on the choice of nothing less than being, which is but a provisional name of what, although appropriated, is not in our disposal. The ontology of the decision points to where the determinations come from. Even if it seems to be a determination of the world itself, it echoes the determination of the sense of “me” which is determinate precisely by the way it decides and not the other way round.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


