



Logos game.

Juego de Logos.

DOI: 10.32870/sincronia.axxv.n79.7a21

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Received: 24/09/2020

Reviewed: 22/10/2020

Accepted: 03/11/2020

ABSTRACT

Philosophy has given little –not to mention modern sciences- in explaining what this game is about. No treatise, few phenomenologies and almost no hermeneutics, dedicated to something so trivial and complex, at the same time, as is the game. What do we play? How do we do it and for what purpose? Does the game cover some mysterious meaning? What about the *logos* with the game? From an essentially ontological perspective, the article addresses these questions through a brief exegesis of the thinkers that seem fundamental to the question of the game. The meaning of the game, then, emerges in a ritual and almost cosmological relationship with chance itself. The nod in the title to the famous novel by George R.R. Martin, was not only looking for a mere play on words that anticipated –in the idea of a *logos* "playing"- the possibility of a clarifying criticism of the playful reason, already thought by Holzapfel in 2003. *Game of Thrones* would be, in reality, something like the paradigm of the postmodern game, a true vanishing point for a bewildered *Homo ludens*.

Keywords: Chance. Game. Holzapfel. *Homo ludens*. Sense.

RESUMEN

Poco se ha dado la filosofía –ni hablar de las ciencias modernas- en explicar de qué trata esto del juego. Ningún tratado, pocas fenomenologías y casi ninguna hermenéutica, dedicadas a algo tan trivial y complejo, a la vez, como es el juego. ¿A qué jugamos? ¿Cómo lo hacemos y



con qué fin? ¿Encubre el juego algún sentido misterioso? ¿Qué hay del *logos* con el juego? Desde una perspectiva esencialmente ontológica, el artículo aborda estas interrogantes mediante una breve exégesis de los pensadores que parecen fundamentales a la pregunta por el juego. El sentido del juego, entonces, aflora en una relación ritual y casi cosmológica con el mismo azar. El guiño del título a la archifamosa novela de George R. R. Martin, no solo buscaba un mero juego de palabras que anticipara –en la idea de un *logos* “jugando”- la posibilidad de una aclaradora crítica de la razón lúdica, pensada ya por Holzapfel en 2003. *Juego de Tronos* sería, en realidad, algo así como el paradigma del juego posmoderno, un verdadero punto de fuga para un desconcertado *Homo ludens*.

Palabras Clave: Azar. Juego. Holzapfel. *Homo ludens*. Sentido.

1. Introduction

Everything is in the game. Even in the most radical circumstances of the human being, those that could even decide transcendental issues, such as life, the inheritance of our species or our love life, there is something "at stake", more often than not dramatically. The game keeps us on tenterhooks. Curiously, it has destination tints. It rather resembles a puppeteer who with a great laugh leaves us motionless in a certain position, while he proceeds to move the other pieces of our existence, to, after giving us movement again, make with his threads that the game continues. And yet, it fascinates us. Not for nothing the theory of the game has today a relevant role in the design of business strategies in a good part of the market. It would be, in this case, precisely, an economic game. Huizinga (2000) will say, in his well-known *Homo ludens* (1938): "The game is changed into serious things and serious things into things. It can rise to heights of beauty and holiness that are far above the serious" (p. 21). As noted in this commentary by the Dutch philosopher, the game also flirts with the sacred. Then we ask ourselves: What is the game? Where does it live? And, above all, how? What, if it could be said, is his birth certificate? Is it, perhaps, a mere gamble?

In his *Logic of Meaning* (1969), Gilles Deleuze affirms the immanence of being in the idea of a becoming, "determined" precisely by absolute chance. The remarkable thing is that the figure



proposed by the French to explain this mode of affirmation is... the roll of the dice. Says Deleuze (2005):

Each run is itself a series, but in a time smaller than the minimum of thinkable continuous time [...] The runs are successive with respect to each other, but simultaneous with respect to this point that always changes the rule, which coordinates and branches the corresponding series, breathing chance throughout each [...] The ideal game we are talking about cannot be performed by a man or by a god. It can only be thought of, and also thought of as meaningless. (pp. 48-49).

Of course, this lack of sense of the game noticed by Deleuze refers to a conscious sense, until, one might assume, logical, the way in which the game machines are regulated or calibrated for the amusement of the players. In other words, this great game –the game of being through chance– only makes sense, in turn, intended only as a pure game. As Díaz (2012) points out: "In truth, to play the game of immanence is *to affirm* the totality of what happens in a single roll of the *dice*"(p. 92).

I will try, through a brief exegesis of some authors who have seemed fundamental to me, to develop an approach to the game understood as an existential phenomenon and, at the same time, to clarify the possible link that there would be between game and meaning. Already authors such as Schiller, Baudrillard, Caillois, Deleuze, Holzapfel, or Heraclitus himself, have referred at different times to the problem of gambling. By the way, the list could also include Heidegger and the second Wittgenstein and their language games. In any case, more than a compilation of these "theories", it is here, above all, to ask ourselves how it is that the game could continue to be understood in the middle of the Era of Big Data as a phenomenon capable of donating meaning, or seen in another way, what the game would have to do today, for example, with infoxication or Artificial Intelligence. I make the proviso that, although it is here an approach from the philosophy of the game, its development is, by far, permeated by other disciplines, which have shown an equal or greater concern than philosophy itself for the phenomenon of the game, such as literary criticism, sociology or philosophical anthropology. In this way, the four sections that make up this writing will focus on the



respective theories about the game of Huizinga, Caillois, Baudrillard and Holzapfel, following a kind of backbone in relation to the game/sense binomial. The conclusions will try to connect the notion of play with some scopes of postmodernity.

2. Huizinga, the game as a foundation

In his *Homo ludens*, Johan Huizinga wonders about the nature of the game, about what the game is or represents for the human being. Among several characteristics that it assigns, it draws attention, against any explanation of biological or spiritual order, that which defines it as a phenomenon rooted in the aesthetic (Huizinga, 2000, p. 13). Play, then, affects our sensitivity. To this extent, and being an aesthetic expression that we can also appreciate without major inconveniences in animals, it could not – it continues – correspond to a rational phenomenon. The reason, then, is left out of its foundation. As Carreras (2017) sees it: "With this declaration of intentions, Huizinga claimed the game as a cultural phenomenon (and not as a simple biological function)" (p. 108). However, despite not being the game in Huizinga's understanding a phenomenon of the rational type, every game inevitably means something. With this conjecture, the game would be definitively inscribed in the dimension of meaning. Moreover, Huizinga will be exhaustive in this kind of onto-anthropological framing of the game and will come to say that it is the only human dimension impossible to be denied. He writes in *Homo ludens*: "Almost everything abstract can be denied: right, beauty, truth, goodness, spirit, God. Seriousness can be denied; the game, no" (Huizinga, 2000, p. 14).

Huizinga's game (2000) is first and foremost a *performance* of the player, which crystallizes in the construction or "transmutation [through his participation in the game] into animated life forms" (p. 15). In any case, Huizinga's theory could hardly be understood if in parallel his belief in one's own culture as a playful entity is not taken for granted. His central thesis is that play is the foundation of culture, given that the great occupations of human coexistence are precisely impregnated with play (Ríos, 2009, p. 5). Huizinga (2000) emphasizes, regarding the synthesis of play/culture in the Roman Empire:



The playful character is manifested, with the greatest force, in the famous *panem et circenses*. Bread and play was what the public asked of the state [...] Roman society could not live without play, which constituted for it a foundation of existence, as well as bread. (p. 225).

In this regard, and going to another work of the Dutch anthropologist, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages* (1930), we see that precisely the configuration of military orders and the allocation of chivalric vows seem to be strongly grounded in the game:

The chivalric vow can have an ethical-religious significance, which places it in the same line as ecclesiastical vows; or its content and significance may be of an erotic-romantic nature; or finally, the vote may have degenerated into a cutting game with no greater significance than that of a hobby. In fact, these three values are given together. The idea of the vote oscillates between the supreme consecration of life in the service of the highest ideal and the most vain mockery in the jocular game of society, which mocks the boldness, love and interests of the State. The game is the element that prevails; the vows came to become for the most part an ornament of the courtly feasts. (Huizinga, 1998, p. 126).

However, this apparent functionality, the game, as with the free play of imagination and understanding in the Kantian beauty judgment, is completely disinterested. The game does not pursue by itself any purpose other than simply to experience that fruition of playing; and as has already been hinted at, it will acquire in Huizinga (2000) a mysterious trail of sacredness: "However, the human game, in all its higher forms, when it means or celebrates something, belongs to the sphere of celebration or worship, the sphere of the sacred" (p. 22). From this laya, it will also be closely linked to the notions of sacredness and war. The concept of divinity and of one's own death would be found in Huizinga (2000), in an unsuspected way, in the very foundation of the game: "The medieval tournament was a parodic combat, a game, therefore; but it seems that in its primitive form it possessed bloody severity and that it was fought to death [...]" (p. 117). If the sacred and the passage from life to death (aspects that Huizinga even connects with the myth) are determined by the game, then the same existence is, so to speak, traversed playfully. As Yepes (1996) notes,



confirming this kind of idea of sacred play: "If we understand the liturgy as one of the playful forms, which can only be done with the appropriate nuances, which avoid taking it as something unserious, we see that in its contact with the divinity is made" (p. 48).

3. The Caillois games

Roger Caillois, on the other hand, will develop a phenomenology of the game focused on the notion of rule. They would be those of Caillois, therefore, regulated games; an idea that will later be radically reconsidered by Jean Baudrillard in *De la seducción* (2000). However, these rules in Caillois are inherent rules of the game, that is, it is not that it is a game altered by a non-playful reality of the rule. On the contrary, it is, as he says, conventions that the players of the game themselves give themselves in order to make their participation in it make sense. They would be properly internal rules of the game, which can only make sense to the extent that one dares to follow them and, therefore, to play according to them. The Monopoly rule, for example, of "going to jail" if the dice determine it, only makes sense to the extent that the player has already taken a turn and has experienced the vertigo of being able to also "skip" that sanction and continue, thus, accumulating goods or money, or recover from some loss, which is precisely the purpose or meaning of the game.

For Caillois (1986) the game is determined by two fundamental principles: *paidiá* and *ludus*. As we shall see, the two are intimately connected. The first, *paidiá*, "is defined by traits such as 'capacity for improvisation and joy', 'fun', 'turbulence', 'free improvisation', 'carefree fullness', 'runaway fantasy', 'anarchic and capricious nature', 'need for agitation' and 'desires to deceive or challenge'" (Medina, 2016, p. 190). The *ludus*, on the other hand (which Holzapfel prefers to translate as "obstacle"), functions rather as the regulating instinct of free improvisation that *paidiá* represents. According to Medina (2016), "[the *ludus*] is the result of the regulation of that instinctive turbulence under 'arbitrary conventions'. These are nothing more than the rules of the game [...] in order to make it more difficult to achieve the desired result" (p. 190). Now, if we look more closely, we cannot but be surprised at the similarity of this "cartography" of Caillois' game and the faculties that Kant has described that are set in motion precisely in his theory of the beautiful, in this case, imagination and



understanding. In fact, Kant literally speaks in several passages of the third critique as the "free play" of both faculties. But not only that, precisely the Kantian imagination, as well as the *paidiá* of Caillois, would act as that overflowing fantasy that, if it is not put a shortcut, could lead reason towards an infinity of ideas that would overflow it dramatically. Similarly, the understanding in Kant stoically fulfills that mission that Caillois assigns to the *ludus* in his game theory. Hence Kant explicitly says that in this free game understanding is responsible for giving limits to the imagination and, punctually, for establishing "the intellectual understanding of the object" (Real, 2015, p. 194).

From this background, and as it is well known, Caillois will classify the games into four types: *agon*, *alea*, *mimicry* and *ilinx* games. *Agon* games are basically the competition games (one could rank most sports here). As Holzapfel (2003) points out, in these "it is properly a testing of skills and abilities, it is in them where the attachment to sufficient reason is most present" (p. 74). However, the Chilean philosopher insists, it should not be forgotten that the game itself (that is, every game), "having a foundation and a purpose only in itself, means in advance a suspension of sufficient reason" (Holzapfel, 2003, p. 74). From the point of view of their proper development, *agon* games involve sustained attention, appropriate training, assiduous efforts and the will to win, discipline and perseverance: *agon* is presented as the pure form of personal merit (Caillois, 1986, p. 45). In turn, the games of *alea* or luck correspond to those where chance is the fundamental, but in which destiny also intervenes, in short, the transcendent, in which our personal merits are not taken into account (Holzapfel, 2003, p. 75). If we had to say so, it would be those games closest to divinity, to the designs of the supernatural. Literally, it would be those games in which the result of our participation is "lucky". Online chess, for example, usually involves playing with opponents of whom I do not have the slightest information, and who would even be, in practice, indiscernible from a computer. On the other hand, the well-known *Blackjack* –a classic of casinos– also involves a series of random determinations, including the reception of the two initial cards of each hand. Dice roll, of course, could well be the ultimate expression of this "total chance."

The third type of game that Caillois identifies, those of *mimicry*, are essentially representation or role-playing games. Thinking about these games we immediately evoke our childhood, those



scenes in which we transformed into "dad" or "mom", or a doctor, even "policemen" and "thieves", according to the well-known game. The reality, from the moment we assume each of these roles, changes in a pee! However, as it is a game, the disconnection is never complete, that is, it is not –in the very routine of the game– evasion games, but evocation. As Caillois himself (1986) observes:

Pleasure consists in being another or impersonate another. But, as this is a game, in essence it is not a matter of deceiving the viewer. The boy who plays the train may well refuse his father's kiss by telling him not to kiss the locomotives, but he does not try to make him believe that he is a real locomotive. (p. 55).

The last games described by Caillois are the games of *ilinx* or vertigo. These are those games in which the decisive thing, as will be assumed, is the risk; and this can go, for example, from the conception of hang gliding or *offshore* as high-risk sports-games, to the ball game practiced by some pre-Columbian peoples of Mesoamerica, and where the losing team (or winner, according to a debate not yet resolved by historians) was literally sacrificed. In any case, the roller coaster seems to reflect this type of game par excellence. As Caillois (1986) puts it, the *ilinx* games: "[...] they consist of an attempt to destroy for an instant the stability of perception and to inflict on the lucid consciousness a kind of voluptuous panic [...] it is a matter of reaching a kind of spasm, trance or daze [...]" (p. 58). Holzapfel (2003) sums it up very clearly: "thus, as we have just seen, the *alea* awakens in us the intellectual and spiritual; no doubt that the *agon* awakens and spurs our will; the *mimicry* our imagination, and the *ilinx* the body and the death drive" (p. 79).

4. Baudrillard, chance stuck

In his 1990 text, *On Seduction*, Baudrillard will describe seduction as play. But, since seduction is the ontological counterpart of the Baudrillardian simulacrum, that is, the irreversible ontology of the postmodern, the game of seduction must also be an inadvertent game, a game contrary to production. The game that Baudrillard relates is the artificial game, closer, if one had to look for a kind of simile, to the game of *alea* of Caillois, but through an inverted strategy, in other words, going



even beyond all randomness and blocking all possibility of random determinism. Now, if this is so, if there is such a thing as an "afterlife" of chance, resembling a field open to vertigo, then Baudrillard's game is inscribed at the same time in the domain of *ilinx* games. Hence Baudrillard opposes the playful game. He writes in the cited work: "What happens to a chess match played with a computer? Where is the intensity of chess, where is the pleasure of the computer? One belongs to the order of the game, the other to that of the playful" (Baudrillard, 2000, p. 151). The exact concept used by Baudrillard is that of abolished chance. It's not just that we wait for chance to do its thing in a dice roll, or in a lottery draw, where there is a statistically measurable possibility that I am the winner, but especially that this same chance gets stuck in a mysterious indeterminacy, so to speak, one step away from disbelief. Baudrillard (2000) says: "The ideal vertigo is that of the dice play that ends up 'abolishing chance', when, against all probability, zero comes out several times in a row, for example" (p. 139).

Holzapfel will see in Baudrillard's game theory an abysmal determination of the rule, which is not, in short, the determination of the law. It would be, if we understand Holzapfel well, the very rule of seduction. The Chilean philosopher says:

The rule to which games and rituals are subjected only have an immanent meaning (which is completely arbitrary, such as in chess the horse moves as it moves, or in a ritual you have to dance around the fire). The law, on the other hand, is transcendent, since it has to be justified in relation to something *else*, such as its persecution of order, social justice, the common good, security. (Holzapfel, 2003, p. 103)

If the playful is the game of production -expressed in the different phases of the simulation-, the game of seduction is the one that integrates in a surprising way the symbolic, the ritual and the pleasant. In the sayings of Baudrillard (2000): "Not as a death drive [...], but [as] a form of ritual spell, of ceremonial in which the signs, by exerting a kind of violent attraction on each other, leave no room for the sense [...]" (p. 140). Chess seems to be the perfect picture of the game at Baudrillard. In this regard, Gadamer will dwell precisely on what Baudrillard called the "intensity" of the game. For the



German philosopher, the paradigmatic of chess lies in the fact that the chess player gives himself completely to the game, in something like an existential unfolding. There, in full chess ecstasy, the seriousness of the game merges with the same entertainment that seduces. Notes Gadamer (2017):

The game only fulfills its own objective when the player abandons himself to the game. What makes the game entirely a game is not a reference to the seriousness [...] but only the seriousness of the game itself. The one who doesn't take the game seriously is a spoiler. (cit. in Peña, 2019, p. 11)

By the way, we could speak of a phenomenon of self-absorption, of abandonment, very close to the mystical ecstasy related by several philosophers of the sacred, including Bataille (1957). Peña (2019) observes it very correctly: "The seriousness lies in the fact that the player must abandon himself to the game since, otherwise, the player does not manage to impregnate himself with the freedom characteristic of the activity and, consequently, does not access the desired enjoyment" (p. 11). Probably the case of Emanuel Lasker is the most illustrative of what it is to say with that of an intensity beyond all measure. The Prussian chess player dominated world chess for decades at the beginning of the twentieth century and caused unprecedented perplexity, given his particular style of play, mixture of combinative chess and mathematical intuition. From this lay, the following passage from Robert Löhr's *The Chess Machine* (2007) clearly reflects this attribute of "world by itself" that chess would possess, in the manner of a magnet:

The Turkish chess player was sold after Kempelen's death by his son Karl, for ten thousand francs, to the royal imperial court machinist Johann Nepomuk Mälzel of Regensburg, the inventor of the metronome. When Napoléon Bonaparte, in 1809, occupied the city of Vienna, he expressed his desire to play against the chess machine, and Mälzel arranged a meeting at Schönbrunn Castle. The French emperor was a renowned chess player, but lost the first two games against the Turk, or if you will, against Johann Allgaier. In the third game, the corso repeatedly made wrong moves, following which the furious android swept with his forearm all the figures on the board, with great amusement from Bonaparte. (p. 408)



As Holzapfel (2003) suggests, commenting in turn on Baudrillard, "this taking over the game of us is even capable of altering the codes and the usual meanings that things have for us" (p. 104). Because in the quoted excerpt: Does Emperor Bonaparte play against an android? Does it, trivially, one player against another? Or, on the contrary, does a human being radically do it against a chess machine?

5. Play and sense in Holzapfel

Considering Weischedel's scheme, Holzapfel will conceive of the game as a source of meaning. His *Critique of Playful Reason*, as it has been conceived, emphasizes precisely this mutual absorption between play and meaning. However, Holzapfel also seems to alert the reader of Heidegger's decisive influence on his hermeneutics of the game. In such a way that – allow me the twist – all his anthropology of the game is developed by Holzapfel always with respect to what would be the problem of meaning for contemporary man. If this is so, then there is in Holzapfel a real critique of the postmodern game, a matter that, of course, is in perfect harmony with his critique of playful reason. It would therefore be about the meaning of the game. This criticism seems to acquire greater vigor especially from Holzapfel's comment on the game in Deleuze. This perspective focuses attention on the fundamental relationship –constitutive, I would say– between gambling and chance. Seen in this way, Holzapfel seems to mean, on the one hand, that life would acquire full meaning –as has just been said– only understood from the game/sense paradigm and that, on the other, such a paradigm acquires meaning properly from its connection with chance. Holzapfel (2003) states:

Returning to the "ideal game", what is *put into play* is so that the first roll (the bigroll) is random, chaos, *continuum*, becoming (which can be *coupled* with that initial let yourself be caught and be seized by the game), and the challenge would be that all the particular rolls are made in the manner of a nomadic distribution (modifying with each roll the rules), and not sedentary. (p. 117).

For our author this ideal game cannot, therefore, be based on any principle or postulate that has to do with something similar to a sufficient reason or with a certain calculated version of being anchored



in tradition. The foundation of this ideal game can only be the same playful reason. For Holzapfel (2011) –who follows Deleuze here to the letter– the Great Game is the game of alea, of chance/destiny: "We are put into play in the game of alea, which at the same time consists of playing that game, which becomes in the end a game at the same time of dying" (p. 209). It can be seen with some clarity that Holzapfel's reflection on the game is based on the criticisms not only of Deleuze, but also of Baudrillard and Heidegger himself, whom we could rightly recognize as the great philosophers of meaning. All this philosophy of the game, as he says, of transgressive cut, is oriented precisely in the direction of a game as the denied, as the *antilogos*, or if you want, as the non-strategy. Holzapfel (2003) notes: "With this, as is the proper thing of our society, we end up in such a situation in which the *agon* is on the side of virtue, while the *alea* predominantly on the side of vice" (p. 131). It is obvious in the author's language that special concern for everyday phenomena, consubstantial to his philosophical anthropology. Thus, the *alea* (or absolute chance) not only escapes the *agon*, which ends up appropriating elite games, such as professional sports; the *alea*, in addition, is hidden, tends to disappear from the sight of the same sufficient reason. You can see him, observes Holzapfel (2003), in enclosed areas, where you play and bet on this or that. The clandestine bets or the mythical fights of the "fight club" (where I have no idea who my rival will be, or what combative skills he has... or even how long the fight will last!) seem to respond completely to this idea of entirely random gameplay, beyond the apparent agonal outcome of each pitch.

But Holzapfel will assume a certain distance from the analysis of Caillois and Baudrillard when it comes to the notion of cheating player. While both French thinkers leave the cheater out of the game, Holzapfel differs in a specific sense:

For me it is convincing that the cheater must be left out of any specific game, and not only an agonal one, but I am afraid that in the case of real, concrete, everyday and historical *homo ludens*, the matter is very debatable, for the simple reason that – I am afraid – that much more than half the world would be left out of the game and could not be properly *homo ludens*. (Holzapfel, 2020).



In this way, Holzapfel suggests that despite counting the agonal games (those that unquestionably determine today's society) with *fair play* as one of its regulatory protocols (of *ludus*, in Huizinga's conception), it is unavoidable that the trap, or if you prefer, the violation of the rule, is an absolutely inherent condition and, for the same reason, inseparable from the *agon* itself. The *bluff* in poker or the Englund gambit in chess, or some practices that go beyond the limit of ethics, such as doping athletes, bribery of players or entire teams or the falsification of documentation in major competitions, seem to be clear examples of these agonal maneuvers. Now, Holzapfel (2020) will say, the *agon* is always the *alea* of the *agon*, since the *agon* that has been given to us (our capacities, skills, abilities), has precisely been given to us by the *alea*, by chance or destiny. Holzapfel's philosophy of play is still a lucid mixture of an existential, aesthetic and even cosmological perspective:

The game of *alea* is the only game that would be not only human, but even extrahuman, and that gives rise to us being able to talk about a playful cosmos, as Heraclitus of Ephesus does in one of his aphorisms or Martin Heidegger, who tells us about a game of being. (Holzapfel, 2020)

Precisely Constant gives the reason to Holzapfel, in the sense that, as the philosopher of Valdivia has been proposing, the game seems not to be a simple playful experience, let's say it like this, in the style of the purest or most sublime entertainment, but, to tell the truth, the fundamental experience of the human being, as Heidegger postulates it, that is, as the foundation without foundation. Write Constant (2004):

In the game the *Sein* is "supported", and not on any foundation. The being, for the thinker of *Das Ding* is the most sublime game, a game that has nothing capricious, but to be able to think of being as a game, you must first penetrate the mystery of the game. (p. 78).

6. Conclusions

The nod of the title of this work to the famous novel by George R. R. Martin, not only sought a mere play on words that anticipated –in the idea of a *logos* "playing"– the possibility of a clarifying critique



of playful reason, already thought by Holzapfel in 2003. *Game of Thrones* represents –to put it abusively– the synthesis of the phenomenology of the game in the postmodern era. Although the novel was written more than 20 years ago, its repercussions in the entertainment industry (or to put it in Huizinga's own terms, of culture) extend to the present day and, everything indicates, will extend even for a long time. History, magic, war, cosmology, fiction... in short, practically all the attributes that our authors have recognized as constitutive of the playful experience. It is true that the perspectives of Huizinga, Caillois, Baudrillard and Holzapfel (the "chosen" for this kind of review of the contemporary philosophy of the game) differ from each other precisely in terms of the *performance* of the game (its relationship with the being, with the *logos*, with culture, with the human being himself, with the same chance). That rightly shows the complexity of the matter. That the seemingly most trivial human activity of all might not automatically have a place in the field of rational explanations. Such seems to be the greatest merit of our authors. However, *Game of Thrones* is also something more. It is a kind of icon of those circumstantial sources of meaning that in Holzapfel's sayings have ended up becoming programmatic sources of meaning. His game of thrones has not only been reproduced – with remarkable success – on television or in multiple versions for video games (even with alternative endings at the discretion of the players themselves). The Internet itself is today a platform completely available to watch the entire saga. And that, without counting the economic impact on marketing or tourism associated with the locations where the series has been filmed. I see no other way to interpret Díaz (2012), when he states that the mode of subjectivation that unfolds in the *playful-aesthetic* form becomes a desubjective variable repetition. *Game of Thrones* would actually be something like the paradigm of postmodern play, a real vanishing point for a bewildered *Homo ludens*.

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