



The aesthetic experience as *Ereignis*. Significance and meaning in the relationship with the work of art.

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SUMMARY

The following work seeks to explain the elements that appear in *The Origin of the Work of Art* that allow us to think about the relationship with works of art from an aesthetic-semiotic perspective -in line with the investigations and approach made by Adrián Bertorello-, taking into account the notions of world, significance and *Ereignis* to propose a non-metaphysical "aesthetics" that is inserted in the crucial question of the fate of *Dasein* and its relation with the Truth of being, taking as its center the ontological foundation of the sense that "transappropriated" itself to it and that opens to a semantic experience in art.

Keywords: E Heidegger. Aesthetic experience. Significance. *Ereignis*.

ABSTRACT

The following work develops the elements that appear in *The origin of the work of art* that allow to think the relationship with the artworks from an aesthetic-semiotic approach -in line with the



researches and the perspectives held by Adrián Bertorello—, taking in consideration the notions of world, signification and *Ereignis* in order to propose a non-metaphysical "aesthetic" that may be inserted in the crucial matter of the destiny of the *Dasein* and its connection with the Truth of Being, focusing in the evenemential foundation of meaning that "trans-propriates" to it leading to a semantic experience with the art.

Keywords: Heidegger. Aesthetic experience. Significance. *Ereignis*.

Introduction

It is generally said that the question of art in Heidegger is reduced (without losing the incredible depth it reaches) to an ontology of the work of art in which, regardless of how coherent or interesting it is, the "enigma of art" travels a path that leads to a philosophy of art that does not make an aesthetic possible. Heidegger himself warns of the danger of reducing the work of art to a mere "object" for a subject; in fact, traditional aesthetics as a discipline born in full modernity conceives the work as that object that is perceived by the *aísthesis*, the sensitive human perception. This given the sensitivity, perhaps processed by some reflective aesthetic judgment, added to the same capacity for imagination, resulted in a subjective experience (*Erlebniss*) that should give us the pattern of what is the essence of art. These experiences would not only prove what corresponds to the norms on taste and artistic delight, but also the norms that must configure the artistic production itself. Thus, at the height of modern subjectivism, everything refers to an experience; but, as our author says, "perhaps experience is the element in which art dies" (Heidegger, 1935, p. 57).¹

Heidegger's entire thought seeks to overcome traditional metaphysical categories, to overcome the "forgetfulness of being", to think about the "question most worthy of being thought". Metaphysics, in fact, which properly begins with Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, is

¹ For reasons that I will later indicate, the first version of that text that dates from 1931, until recently unpublished, and that has been translated by Ángel Xolocotzi into *Journal of Philosophy N° 115*, year 38, Mexico, Universidad Iberoamericana, digital version. For its distinction, it will be clarified which version is used by indicating its years, 1931 or 1935.



basically the history of the forgetfulness of being as long as it has been thought of as an entity. This static and certainly reductive vision is the basis of practically all current philosophies, which do not know or ask about the meaning of being, but simply pose various "worldviews". All current philosophy would be framed in this abandonment, so naturally all philosophy of art would also deal with the relationship with works as entities-objects and not from the relationship between man and being, which is the great underlying issue. That is why Heidegger seeks to use a radically new terminology, making a very particular appropriation of Husserl's phenomenological method, to think about the work of art from a more "original" plane.

Thus it rejects the categorizations inherited from Aristotle's time that "explain" works (and entities in general) from hylemorphism as well as rejects the subject-object duality, as exploited as patently hollow. His style, strongly criticized by a large part of the philosophical community, generated in others a real enthusiasm for thinking from other planes than the already exhausted metaphysics of subjectivity. The origin of the work of art aroused countless studies on the being of the works, the essence of art, the truth that takes place there; however, as I pointed out earlier, they have usually set out to develop the lines opened by this ontology of the works, and not so much the relationship that each Dasein can have with them. What is commonly called "aesthetic experience" does not receive any kind of treatment, perhaps probably because of Heidegger's rejection of aesthetics (always taking into account that it refers to a metaphysical discipline, and therefore that it must be overcome), although there are certain implicit elements that, in my opinion, can be approached from another approach independent of "mere" sensitivity (if this exists monodically).

The following work seeks to explain the elements that appear in *The Origin of the Work of Art* that allow us to think about this relationship with works of art from another field, in this case, from an aesthetic-semiotic perspective – in line with the investigations and approach made by Adrián Bertorello (Cf. Bertorello, 2008) – taking into account the notions of world-significance-Ereignis to propose a non-metaphysical "aesthetics" that is inserted in the crucial question of destiny of Dasein and the possibility of its authentic existence in relation to the Truth of being.



World and Meaning in Being and Time

It is necessary, in order to properly walk the path that we will follow around the relationship with the work of art, to refer initially to the notion of the world that Heidegger coined, partly taken from Husserl, partly developed from his early lessons to his preparation in *Being and Time* where for the first time he reaches a decisive place in the question of the meaning of being. As we know, the whole work seeks to answer that question; however, it is highly likely that readers who approach it for the first time will miss that already at the beginning, in paragraph 2, that question receives a first outline of the answer: "[...] the being, that which determines the entities as entities, that 'about which' the entities, however they are elucidated, are in each case already understood" (Heidegger, 2014,²p. 15). This proposition agrees almost perfectly with the notion of the world, defining the very existential constitution of Dasein. The question of the meaning of being is asked from the being of Dasein, as it is the only entity "to which its being goes". The proper (or improper) existence of Dasein is intimately affected by its relationship with being, as a horizon of intelligibility where "intra-worldly" entities appear.³

The world, in fact, is not the totality of the entities of the universe. Heidegger distinguishes between two ontic and two ontological senses of the world, the one used for his existential analysis being the one who thinks of the world as "worldliness", an intentional structure of Dasein. It "opens the world" in so far as it is its "there", where the entities are presented in two modalities: either as being-before-the-eyes, or as being-to-the-hand. In reality, they are two aspects about the same entity, which change according to the mode of presentation / appearance of this front to the Dasein. In *SuZ*, however, it is the being-to-the-hand, the useful, that becomes a model for thinking about the meaningful relationship with the entities and the world itself. Every useful necessarily implies a reference to an articulated system of references, always in relation to other beings-to-the-hand, stressed sympathetically towards a "stop". Thus, the being of the useful consists in its reference to this totality.

² Hereinafter "*SuZ*"

³ Emphasis added.



This totality, from the point of view of Dasein, translates into conformity that refers to the "por-mor-de-qué", the final-practical, self-founded instance, horizon of all the references of the useful and foundation of intelligibility. It is the por-mor-de-qué that opens a space of meaning, and that will be the world: a space of meaning structured by significance. This disposition of the entities that manifest themselves in a horizon of understanding is what is proper to the worldliness of the world, which is originally projected from the Dasein itself insoin insoout itself insoout that it is he who opens the space. Every relationship indicated in this "state of openness" implies this original understanding, and from it is that all the relations of the referring are a "meaning": thus, the significance

[...] it harbors in itself the ontological condition of the possibility that the 'being there' that it understands can, as 'being-there' that interprets, open what are said 'meanings' that in turn found the possible being of the word and of language. Open significance is, as an existential structure of the 'being-there', of its 'being in the world', the ontic condition of the possibility of the discovery of a totality of conformity. (p. 102)

If we remember the above as the first approximation to the sense of being, that "on which" the entities are determined (as before-the-eyes or as a-la-hand) and understood, we can rightly think that in Heidegger the being itself is the world, as a space of meaning. It may be useful to think of it analogously as the significant function of Greimas, that which institutes the link between meaning and signifier.

It is important to take all this into account when addressing The Origin of the Work of Art, where the notion of the world is subtly "displaced", when Dasein is no longer so much the center of this space, but its axis will be decentered taking as a fundamental instance the work itself.

2. The struggle for meaning in the work of art

The origin of the artwork was initially written in 1931 although it was not presented until 1935-1936, in the framework of conferences where Heidegger reformulated it. Although it is a text



already influenced by the Kehre, notorious since From the essence of truth, this first version above all maintains a style and features that make it closer to the phenomenological period of the so-called "first Heidegger". This first version is noticeably shorter and more concrete than the one later published, although not by them less profound; in fact, its greater expository clarity helps to understand a large number of issues that in the 1935 text are obscured by that plus of poetic arguments that were, for some, apparently very shocking.

Divided into only two parts, it also begins by discarding the idea of thinking about the work from mere experience; proposes to think about the work of art from its character of thing-work. It is important to note that Heidegger is always thinking about "the great art", which is a big question of what he means; naturally to classical-romantic art, but can't his reflection also be extended to other more contemporary types of art? In principle, it covers works that have been preserved and arranged in contexts space-time different from those where it arose. In that sense, they have been "taken out of their world"; we'll see what implication this has later. To begin with, there is something in his being-work that has been lost. This implies that the work wants to be patent and public in some way, as it "takes effect" by standing out towards the open. The work, by itself, is to the work, in its exhibition. This does not refer to the fact of being exhibited in a museum or in a certain exhibition, but constitutes an erection, which is both consecration and glorification. Heidegger points out that, in its consecration, the work is an offering, a gift, which opens the space of the sacred. That is where the god "is driven towards the openness of his presence", which entails glorification as recognition of "the dignity and splendor of the god". It is true that the Heideggerian style is highly ambiguous, especially in these poetic resources, which supports very diverse interpretations. However, perhaps an interpretative key is given a few lines below: "every exposition in the sense of the consecrating-glorifying erection is always also an uprising as a type of placement of the construction and the statue, in so far as to say and name within a language" (Heidegger, 1931 p. 9). Perhaps this "space of the sacred" is rather that



semantic area of advenient meanings, which bring the "splendor"/clarity of a new meaning donated by the same work.⁴

Indeed, this is where the notion of the world appears, since "the work is in itself a rise where a world is broken and as soon as it is open it is put into permanence"; the world is not, as we have already seen, the totality of the entities of the cosmos, but it is a kind of "entourage" that accompanies Dasein and from which every emerging entity is oriented: "the world munda". This worldliness can never be conceived as an object for a conscience, but "pointing keeps our doing removed and left in an assemblage of remissions from which the winking benevolence and the beating fatality of the gods arrives and is absent." This world opened by the work, as a significant structure, occurs not so much in the work itself but in dasein; and this, of course, cannot happen without at least some transformation of it. The work exposes a world, that is, a plexus of meanings and references that revolutionizes the semantic field of being-there. In this sense, the criterion for determining the value of a work as a work of art, even to delimit the "great art", is this essential feature of the exhibition of a world; if this does not happen, "it is not a work of art, but it is a piece of art that is to the work in nothing, only exhibits an empty power and perhaps even makes some⁵ impression". Heidegger criticizes this position that places the intensity of the experience that one feels when contemplating a work in the highest place, when in reality what it is about is an experience of deep meaning that must affect the relationship of Dasein with being. From this last assertion it is possible to open the playing field of what would include the "great art", relativizing it towards an experience that does not remain in the sensitivity of the moment, but implies a transformation of the world. He works a "superior rejection" of the usual, of the everyday, which can resemble the poetic function of the Russian formalists, where the ordinary is broken and darkened forcing the delay and deepening of the given. The work then creates the semantic space that she dominates and articulates, raising by herself, but through Dasein a world.

⁴ Emphasis added.

⁵ Let us remember that the presentation-subtraction is the very dynamics of being, which is shown and hidden.



This participation of Dasein in the putting-to-work of the work will be crucial, as we will see later.⁶

In addition to the exhibition, being-work of the work belongs the composition. Heidegger had already indicated that the being of the work could not be thought of from its being-created by an artist; this could easily develop from the matter-form model predominant in metaphysical aesthetics since Plato and Aristotle, but thus condemning itself to the lack of foundation and depth of the other thinking. Rather, Heidegger indicates that the being-work of the work is literally a com-rapporteur. What is composed is what the earth calls, "that which unfolds constant fullness and yet takes up for itself what is unfolded and retains it" (1931,p. 11). The essence of the earth is its closure in the open by the world; it is not the mere materiality of the work, but the essential indeterminacy of the plane of expression, that is, of the sensitive element that precisely composes the work. The work does not possess the earth as a material cause, but "supports" it in itself, placing itself on the earth as in its foundation-unfounded, in that abyss of the constitutive opacity of pure sensible expression. This composition, as *Herstellung*, is a "production", that where the world is located, the latent origin of meaning. Now, what relationship do world and earth have between themselves?

Heidegger shows that between them there is an essential correlation that determines the fundamental and proper feature of the being-work of the work: it is the *polymos*, the struggle between both dimensions, the being of the work. The world does not tolerate anything closed, the earth for its part is constantly closing resisting to enter the clearing of the open by the world. How does this happen?

As soon as the work is disputed, then it removes the earth, opening it, into a world. This same as a pointing entourage never moves inward from the earth. But this moving removal moves the work forward and inaugurates something open. That is the center of space where the earth is mundanely closed and the world is earthly open. It is the work

⁶ It is true that Heidegger's thought can be seen as a shift where one begins with a "subjectivity" (making the corresponding gigantic exceptions) that organizes the plexus of references and leads to a decentralization where it is the thing itself that articulates the semantic space, a sign of the "death of the subject" that fertilizes his entire philosophy.



that founds just this space when opening it. This space is the opening of the there, in which things and human beings come to stand, to resist it (1931: 12).⁷

We see that there is a permanent tension, a maintenance of contradiction, which can be thought of as the same confrontation that occurs between the planes of meaning and the content of the sign: there is an attempt to clarify, to structure the essentially unstructurable through a sense, resulting in a permanent effort to comprehend the abyssal of raw sensibility. However, these competing forces delimit the semantic space, the limits of the clearing where the entity manifests itself. And that is where *dasein* is introduced, who, delaying in the work, resists it in its own comprehensive projection, as "there" of the open world.

The work of art thus articulates the plexus of references positioning itself as its center of orientation; such is the strength of the work, "norm of the entity and of the non-entity". It is necessary to see what happens in that open space, and how *Dasein* can be involved there.⁸

The event of truth in art as a transappropriation of meaning

We saw that the work opens the "there", the center of the open as a horizon of intelligibility [to be?] where the entity appears as such. What happens in this space is what Heidegger calls truth – which has little to do with a technical-calculating vision that thinks of it as adequacy – that has its roots in the Greek notion of *alētheia*. Truth is the fundamental event of the inauguration of the opening of the entity, it founds new senses, pragmatically opens new referentialities; "the putting into-work of truth, that is the essence of art" (1931, p. 16). This truth is not something that exists prior to the work, but happens when it arises, at the moment of the opening of the world; we are not in the realm of eternal, strong truths, but in relative truths (to *Dasein*) that "must become," essentially dynamic and contingent. As we pointed out earlier, the very world, the truth that certain works once opened, can decay; Heidegger indicates that "the deprivation

⁷ Emphasis added.

⁸ "The work of art is not only work because it is produced and made, but because it e-fectúa the being in an entity [...]. Thanks to the work of art, understood as the being that is as an entity, everything else that appears and that can be found becomes confirmed, accessible, interpretable and intelligible as an entity or as a non-entity" (Heidegger, 2003 p. 147).



of the world and the decay of the world is something irreversible" (p. 7); the same happens with the being, which happens epochally illuminating in radically different ways the entities that are manifested in it, but that eventually its donation can (and probably will) be extinguished.

This opening of the entity, says Heidegger, happens when it is projected, "poetized"; for the author, "all art is in essence poetry" to the extent that what is manifested in it is different from how it commonly is (the poetic function of language, as we saw before). Only in a project, as a horizon of understanding, can the entity be intelligible (that is, be). This poetic essentiality does not refer to poetry as a singular artistic discipline (although it holds it in the highest esteem), but refers to language as the plane where all art takes place. The essence of language is to elevate the entity to the open in the clearing of the truth that has occurred, it is the structure that signifies the expression of the work itself. Language such as poetry "name things for the first time", brings the entity to the word and to appear. In turn, this saying is a project where "it is announced as what the entity is open", that is, it does not create the entity, but it does define it in its essential modality. Poetry is then the essence of language, and only consequently can it be an "expression" of something, in the ordinary sense; "art and the work of art are not a kind of language, but vice versa: the linguistic work is the fundamental figure of art, since this is poetry": thus, "in poetic saying even the open, where the entity as an entity reaches the deployment and conservation, is projected and become property for human Dasein" (p. 18). What does this "becoming property" of Dasein mean? ⁹

The work of art, as put into work of truth, opens a world, a clear of certain and particular intelligibility, which in both articulated and language is structurally a space of meaning that "donates" the being, that is, the meaning. This is what Heidegger calls Ereignis, and which can be thought of as an event (of) [trans]-propertion of meaning, where Dasein and being appropriate/expropriate each other of the meaning projected in that semantic space crisscrossed by the two open worlds (in this case, of Dasein and the work of art), essentially engaging in an ontological relationship that is the necessary correlate of truth as "between".

⁹ Emphasis added.



What happens in principle between the work of art and man is a semantic-existential relationship, where what prevails is the being/meaning raised as a world, which in turn is not exhausted in its contingent manifestation, but remains as a reserve abyss ("land") for future donations of meaning. The work of art then entails an ontological revelation that shows in fullness what being is like and how it becomes as such for man.¹⁰

For this reason, poetry, as the essence of art, is the foundation of being (and not the creation of the entity): Heidegger ventures us into the meaning of being, which is "what and how the entity is always both open and hidden" (p. 19), that is, the world as a semantic space of the *alleteia*. This foundation refers to three aspects linked together: donation, foundation, and initiation. Although *dasein* is in a passive position, in turn this donation can be thought of as articulated with the poetic project, but also with the project as it is developed in *SuZ*, while "the poetic project is launched into the historical *Da-sein*". Indeed, understanding is a key existential of *Dasein*, articulated both by affective disposition and by language; the "open state" of understanding encompasses "for what sake" and significance, that is, it encompasses being as long as it exists. *Dasein* is essentially its possibility, that which can be on the horizon of its comprehensive project: it is "possibility lying down", possibility of being free to win or lose, responsible for oneself. This understanding has in turn the existential structure of projection, which projects the being of the "being-there" originally on the significance/worldliness of its respective world: "understanding is, as far as projecting, the way of being of the 'being-there' in that this is its possibilities as possibilities" (Heidegger, 2014, p. 163). And, in turn, the "open state" of being in general is inserted into this "projected state".

It is from here that one can think of the way in which art needs man to be and, more concretely, how it is that the truth opened by the work inhibits the very existence of historical *Dasein*. As Heidegger adds in his appendix to the 1949 edition, art is thought of as *Ereignis*; from him, the self is a call made to man, and the open being itself cannot be without them:

¹⁰ It is usually translated by "event"; however, insowrdly possessing the root of the *eigen*, also has the sense of -propertion -As Rebok points out, it can be used both "a-propiation" as "ex-propiation""- (Rebok, s.d.). The connection "(of)" refers to the Sartrean structure of intentionality, where it is possible to think of a differentiation but only from an ontological-phenomenological and non-factual instance.



[...] it is within the human relationship with art where there is the second ambiguity of putting the work of truth, which on page 51 is named as creation and care [...]. In the phrase 'to put the truth into work' [...] hides the relationship of being and the essence of man (Heidegger, 1935,p. 62).

We must now analyze how the aesthetic relationship with art brings in itself the fundamental decision for the truth of being, where not only the destiny of this but the possibility of the ownership or impropriety of the very existence of Dasein is at stake.

Hermeneutic-significant relationships between Dasein and work of art

As long as putting the work of truth, art is poem. It is not only the creation of the work that is poetic, but also, although in another way, the care of the work. In fact, a work is only effectively real as a work when we detach ourselves from our habits and enter into that which is opened by the work so that our own essence can be established in the truth of the entity (p. 54).

We highlight three fundamental ideas that will guide the development of the work from now on: on the one hand, the double modality that Dasein can assume in relation to the significant experience with the work of art; on the other hand, despite the "passivity" of the latter in the rise of the world, we will see how his passivity is somehow active so that the truth may take place in the work; Finally, we will see how the essence of Dasein is revolutionized in the commitment that occurs by the transappropriation of meaning given in the aesthetic experience and how it is articulated with the care of its existential authenticity.

Already from the beginning Heidegger shows that, although the work arises "from and through the activity of the artist", this in turn is "originated" by the work; and both, in turn, have their origin in a third element, which is art. Heidegger's maneuver is to remove all kinds of strong subjectivism from the conception of artistic creation, since what prevails is not so much the psychological motivation of the artist or that the work is a testimony of genius and greatness, but it must be understood that in the work the unconsoilation of the entity occurred and that this



remains in itself with autonomy with respect to the particular act of creation. This does not imply completely ignoring the artist, but understanding that being opened by the work transcends it beyond its initial intentions:

[...] that event that consists in the work having been created is not limited to continuing to vibrate in the work, but it is the same event that the work is as such a work that projects it before itself and keeps it projected around itself. (p. 47).

On the other hand, it should be remembered that as a work this is a struggle between world and earth, and it is precisely in the midst of that struggle that Dasein is thrown into its presence. Heidegger points out that the more essentially the world of work emerges and stands out, at the same time the work becomes darker and stranger in its essential closure, to the point that it seems to "sever all ties with men." However, this is what makes possible our introduction into the bosom of the internal struggle of the work, our entry to participate in this semiotic polymos, since it forces us to leave the usual (and therefore our constant projection and determination of the objectivity of things) to delay in the being of the work. This borrowed "poetic function of language" that we similarly see as an effect of the work, transforms our habitual relations with the world and the earth and thus allows us to "let the work be a work": this is what Heidegger calls "care (Bewahren) for the work", and that is the key to thinking about the aesthetic experience. This letting-being is the fundamental attitude of phenomenology (properly Heideggerian), and thanks to this is that "the work is given in its creation being as that effectively real", that is, it can remain in itself as a significant struggle.

Taking any example, some canvas by Van Gogh or Picasso's Guernica, what happens in that gigantic painting by itself as a work, is the opening of a plexus of meanings, a world, from a composition that does not exhaust that particular truth; Later generations, or even oneself in another turn, can receive different senses, which will also vary according to how much we let the work be and not that we are the ones who struggle to see a certain meaning or "symbol" on the canvas. This letting-being, in addition, moves us to linger in the picture and participate in that polymos, since the land of this one is somehow unfathomable and fundamentally inexhaustible,



and we will resist being inserted in a safe and immutable articulation of references; and when we think we have definitively "understood" all the elements of the image, there will always be possible new interpretations and openings that displace our own world. That is why in the first version of *The Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger rightly states that "the relationship with the public, where there is, is only that it is destroyed by the work" (1931¹¹ p. 8), in the sense that the world of Dasein undergoes a "deconstruction" (with all the licenses we allow ourselves in its use), while significant combat affects the various layers of meaning that Dasein somehow is. In this destructive force, Heidegger says, the greatness of a work of art is measured.

Care as to let-be is as essential to the work as its created self; indeed, "to the same extent that a work cannot be without having been created because it has an essential need for creators, neither can the created itself remain without its caretakers" (1935, p. 48). In this way, although the initiative of foundation of meaning resides in the being of the work, it is clear that Dasein is not at all dispensable, while without Dasein there is no being to open; "if it really is a work, it is always related to the caregivers", even if you wait for them to enter in their truth. However, the forgetfulness of the work is also a way of caring; the work is not reduced to nothingness, but remains latent waiting for the Ereignis. The same goes for being, which in its history has suffered the oblivion and abandonment of man, although perhaps it is rather that it was man who was forgotten and abandoned by being.

The caretakers are certainly figures of the authentic Dasein, which correspond to the call of the being as given in its truth in the work; it is each one of us to the extent that we appropriate the sense founded in each case. Caring for the work implies "staying within the opening of the entity that occurred in the work" (1935, p. 49), and that Heidegger thinks as a kind of knowledge, clearly not representative-objectifying, but a knowledge about being, knowing what is wanted in the middle of the entity. This knowing-loving

[...] it is the ecstatic plunge of the existing man into the unsoulation of being [...].

Wanting is the lucid resolution of a going beyond oneself in existence that is

¹¹ Even, that of the shoes.



exposed to the openness of the entity that appears in the work [...]. Care for the work is, as knowing, the lucid entry into the insecure truth that happens in the work (p. 49).¹²

As can be seen, the insecurity of the work is the possibility of the in-world, the risk of falling into the allosemiotic; hence, the resolution of Dasein, as it is projected to anguish, plays a fundamental role in the projection of the open world by the work, since in turn the event of truth is founded on the abyss of nothingness, that is, of difference. There, man is thrown, ex-attic, into the clearing of the truth, which in turn is the silent and abysmal night of the earth. And yet, in the difficulty involved in appropriating meaning, it is possible for Dasein to participate in the pormos and to understand-interpret the projecting of the work in its own hermeneutic project. That is why "the care of the work does not isolate men in their aesthetic-psychological experiences", but (in addition) introduces them to belonging to the truth of being that occurs in the work of art and thus "founds the being for others and with others as a historical exhibition of being-here from its relationship with unsoulation" (p. 52).¹³

In this way, art also founds the history of a historical people, and that is why poetry is the proto-language that shapes the history of being. Art as the origin of the work is what makes the creators and caregivers emerge in turn, as claimed by the being for the guard of its truth. The poetic project established by the work, which comes from "nothingness" (that is, from being as a difference, not from the ordinary [the entity]), is in turn the hidden determination of historical Dasein, a true agent that supports aesthetic experience. In the truly poetic project the earth is transformed into a homeland and the world into what reigns from the unsoulation of being; thus

¹² In the sense of "state of resolved" as it appears in *Suz*.

¹³ "Does this mean that truth comes out of nowhere? Indeed, if we understand by nothing the mere nothingness of the entity [the ontological difference] and if we represent that entity as that present currently and that due to the instance of the work appears and crumbles as that entity that is only supposedly true" (p. 52)



the foundation that supports the clearing is founded, and insoever retains and accentuates the struggle in its¹⁴ intimacy, it is thus "the creative resist in the abyss" (Heidegger, 2011, §13).

Final Considerations

Throughout this work we have tried to reconstruct, from a semiotic perspective, the arguments developed in *The Origin of the Work of Art* that allow us to glimpse the way in which Dasein relates to the work. Greimas' model of significant function can help to think about this essential struggle that occurs in front of every sign and that is naturally maintained in the work of art; indeed, in everyday practice (the "business" of art), one contemplates works of all kinds, in different places, and generally seeks to find meaning in the works; however, most of the time, although some kind of meaning can be found, it seems that the works "keep for themselves" their own world, as if locking themselves in their own immanent materiality, which makes them dark and demanding a delay on the part of the contemplator, demanding time for them to be. This difficulty typical of every great work (which does not mean that it cannot be applied to contemporary art, mass art) provokes two basic positions; or the subjective and somehow forced projection of one's own experiences that the imagination produces, which is another form of "gossip" as one does not resist the ineffability, the silence that the work is in itself because language is a mystery; or the projection of a world that opens a horizon of meaning as an event of a truth, to the extent that one, delaying, takes care of the work so that it is. In the latter case, as we have already seen, art is an Ereignis as an event that opens a semiotic space where Dasein hermeneutically appropriates the meaning projected by the world of work, while it is appropriated by this same sense. In the end, it can be thought from Sartre that the aesthetic experience will be authentic to the extent that there is a compromise between man and work. This commitment, as getting into-with, implies a transformation of one's own existence, to the extent that the existence of Dasein is nothing but one's own understanding of his being, articulated with his Stimmung and language: it is cure, occupation in his being-relatively-to-

¹⁴ Reference should be made to the *Letter on 'humanism'* (Heidegger, 2001) and all its development of the *schonen* of being, who makes man his "Shepherd"; the prefiguration of the "essential thinker" in remarkable.



death, project-yecto, which must appropriate its existence to win it then for itself. This appropriation is the other side of the Ereignis, which is thus essentially an event of transpropiation [of meaning].¹⁵

What man becomes existing in relation to being is to be authentic, that is, to inhabit "poetically" the earth seeking for his people the opening of horizons of diverse meaning, building the "house of being" that is the language where every entity happens, to bring the word to the entity in its origin. In other later texts, the figures who embody authentic Dasein are the essential thinkers and poets; the former think of being as such, and thus descend to its abyssal depth; the others name the sacred, rising to the "heaven" of the world, activating meaning for a people. Language, "as a conversion of being into a word, became poetry. Language is the proto-poetry in which a people poetizes being" (Heidegger, 2003,p. 156), and vice versa. Poetry in this broad sense is the essence of art, and as such it is that it founds history. We must not forget the evental-epochal character of this, insoout being itself is an event. Nor, consider that the work of art is the only origin of truth and meaning. However, in his marginal annotations to the first version of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger writes: "Art, an origin of truth. Fundamental form of its becoming. Art is history. Action and thinking. Reach jumping" (1931,p. 23). Art is one of the many modes that truth has to happen; and yet, as a fundamental form of becoming, it is a key model of ereignis and the way meaning is given. The "anthropological" model that still persisted in SuZ gives way to an "ontological" model where things, and especially the work of art, are what organize the semantic space where man lives. This limited space, outside of which there is no possibility of an [intelligible] entity, can only be reached by means of a leap; this leap is the decision to take charge of the being, to take charge of one's existence, to take charge of the work through its care.

From these phenomenological-hermeneutic characterizations is that we can think of aesthetic experience as a semantic-existential relationship, where *isisththesis* is not lost (as Heidegger has been criticized at length) but is recognized as an instance articulated by the

¹⁵ We can risk even the idea that art, in so much *Ereignis*, it has its origin in the [authentic] aesthetic experience.



understood language, where what prevails is the *contingent significance* of the work. Only by recognizing this sense in which *some* truth happens is that we can establish with art and with historical humanity itself a true relationship of care, essentially linked to the call of being, thus existing more authentically and poetically.

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