Andrés F. Torres

U.S. Should Re-evaluate Aid Proposed for Colombia

On January 11, of this year, President Bill Clinton boldly committed himself and his administration to fighting the war on drugs. After a tenacious six month lobbying effort by President Andrés Pastrana of Colombia to promote his government’s strategy to reduce drug trafficking and bring political and economic stability to this South American nation, Clinton challenged Congress to pass the so called "Plan Colombia". This comprehensive aid package calls on the United States to contribute roughly $1.3 billion dollars over the next two years as part of an international campaign that hopes to raise a total of $7.5 billion to curtail illicit exports from Colombia. The Clinton administration’s willingness to support this multifaceted initiative --which seeks to combat narcotics trafficking from a variety of angles -- is an important admonishment of the America’s responsibility in the fight against illegal drugs. Nonetheless, U.S. policy makers should re-think the effectiveness of the country’s investment.

Colombian narco traffickers have been continuously exporting illicit substances since the 1970’s, and for nearly thirty years the United States has attempted with little success to reduce drug imports by attacking the supply side. This policy escalated during the Bush administration and significantly increased last year when Congress agreed to provide Colombia with $300 million dollars in anti-narcotics aid, making it the third largest international recipient of American funds.

Through arms sales, military intelligence and training, U.S. funding has constantly focused on beefing up the Colombian security force’s ability to locate and destroy processing labs and conduct fumigation over coca producing regions. U.S. officials claim that the two pronged strategy has been successful in Bolivia and Peru, however, there is little to indicate that such a policy will be effective in Colombia. Various reports indicate that over the last decade, cocaine exports from this country have increased by 260% and a recent CIA study reveals that despite substantial spraying efforts, drug exports in 1999 heightened by 20%. In addition, Colombian narcotics organizations -- which in the past only refined the coca leaf imported from Peru and Bolivia -- not only are cultivating coca in vast quantities, but have also begun to grow poppies from which heroin is derived.

Part of the constant rise in drug production in Colombia can be attributed to the chronic instability caused by the forty-year internal conflict between the Colombian government and the country’s two powerful insurgency groups. Both the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) control large portions of Colombian territory. In addition, for over a decade, both leftist guerrillas and the nation’s right wing paramilitary groups have accrued significant capital by protecting small peasant coca growers as well as through extortion of narco traffickers -- who pay handsome sums of money to safeguard clandestine coca processing laboratories.

The southern region of Putumayo, a stronghold of the FARC and an area with little government presence, has been a central location for coca cultivation, processing and exportation and therefore considered one of the main battlegrounds of the Plan Colombia. As a result, a large portion of the proposed U.S. funding will be applied to create, arm and train two 950 - man anti-narcotics battalions made up Colombian military agents. If the funding were provided, these two regiments would be taught how to operate U.S. Black Hawk helicopters and, if put into action, utilized to penetrate the region, destroy laboratories and conduct vast bacterial spraying. This is to be accomplished while somehow avoiding entanglement with the FARC. Overall, between 80% or 90% of the entire U.S. aid package, as proposed by the White House, would be destined to similar projects throughout the nation with some provisions for alternative crop development initiatives, democratization and judicial reform programs.

This $1.3 billion dollar effort – although well intentioned -- is shortsighted and has its priorities out of order. As history and statistics reveal, eradication has not worked in Colombia and in fact, is often counter-productive. Coca growers over the last several years have been able to skillfully adapt to fumigation tactics by developing mechanisms to cultivate bacterial resistant crops. Moreover, in cases where herbicides have been effective in destroying some plantations, coca growers with the assistance of armed guerrillas or paramilitaries, have simply relocated and colonized areas of the vast virgin rainforest where soil is rich and where there is little or no government presence. The fumigation strategy is thus not only is limited in what it can accomplish but also fortifies the link between peasant growers and armed insurgents. This peasant-guerrilla relationship to a great extent assures the continuation of coca exportation and allows groups like the FARC to expand their fronts while gaining the financing necessary to continue the brutal war.

As opposed to emphasizing the military component of the Plan Colombia, which at best can only put a short-term dent in overall cocaine exports, Congress should approve an aid package that offers long-term solutions. The almost $1 billion dollars reserved for the purchase of costly helicopters and equipment would be better spent on alternative crop cultivation and economic development programs while also keeping U.S. dollars out of the hands of a military with a tarnished human rights record. It is often the case that impoverished farmers have little desire to cultivate coca or poppies but due to extreme poverty find themselves with little alternative. A well-planned and extensive crop substitution program – far beyond the $145 million currently set aside -- could offer options to those farmers whose precarious living conditions forced them into the cultivation of illicit products. Moreover, such a strategy could prove vital in breaking the peasants’ dependency upon the guerrillas and paramilitaries. Equally important, it would keep the United States from getting too involved in military operations that -- although designed to be strictly anti-narcotic missions -- could easily cross the blurry line that separates the armed internal conflict from the war on drugs.

In addition to alternative crop cultivation and economic development programs, there are other strategic areas where the United States should place its focus. The Colombian judiciary system, for example, which according to a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia has a 3% successful prosecution rate, is also in dire need of extensive reform. Any democracy requires a strong and modernized judiciary, and in a nation like Colombia that is under constant assault by organized crime and corruption, the drug problem will not be solved if law enforcement does not have the capacity to prosecute even one-third of crimes committed. Because of the baffling impunity rate, outlaws in Colombia, and especially drug traffickers, operate with little fear of incarceration. In addition, the administration of federal prisons is so ineffective that Mafia bosses regularly direct illegal activities from their jail cells and imprisoned guerrillas orchestrate massive kidnappings and terrorist assaults while "locked up". Again, the money designated for military purposes would be better utilized on modernizing the Colombian legal system, ensuring the extradition of drug dealers, punishing money laundering operations, confiscating illegal property, increasing the investigative capabilities of the Colombian National Police and beefing up interdiction operations.

Although the current situation in Colombia has many of its leaders overwhelmed, President Pastrana has taken courageous and effective steps to tackle the country’s daunting challenges. Foremost among his efforts has been his commitment to pursue peace negotiations with the FARC. Although strongly criticized for demilitarizing five municipalities in south central Colombia in order to initiate talks, there does seem to be some sign of hope. In what some interpreted to be an act of good will, in December, the FARC agreed to a 20-day cease-fire. In addition, insurgency commanders and government officials are currently analyzing the social-democratic institutions of several European countries to study the possible application of such structures to Colombia. Although to outsiders, such activities offer little reassurance of a future peace settlement, to a country that has suffered a brutally violent war that has cost tens of thousands of lives over the span of four decades, such developments are indeed significant.

If the United States wants to find long-term solutions to its drug problem, it should offer more than a paltry $5 million dollars in support of the peace process. In Colombia, it has become starkly apparent that only through a negotiated settlement with the FARC – and more emphasis on domestic drug treatment and prevention programs -- can long lasting advances be made in the effort to stop the export of illicit drugs. An increased financial commitment to alternative crop cultivation, economic development initiatives in impoverished areas and judicial reform is a step in the right direction, while nearly $1 billion dollars in military training and equipment will most likely cause more damage than good. With a strong President in Colombia committed to democracy and peace, and an insurgency movement that for the first time in 10 years has been willing to truly negotiate, now more than ever, it is time for the U.S. and Congress to make the right decisions.